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ABSTRACT

There w ere two main objectives o f this study.

The first objective was to

develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations.

To meet this

objective, a model was developed which was prim arily grounded in prior research
related to auditor resignations as well as prior research addressing auditor switching.
The second objective was to estimate the model at four different quarterly dates
immediately prior to an event date (i.e., the resignation date) so that the effects o f time
on the explanatory power o f the model and each independent variable could be
ascertained.

This objective was met by identifying and collecting data at each

quarterly date for each variable in the model and by using logit regression to analyze
the data (i.e., to estimate the model at each quarterly date prior to the event date). The
sample o f companies included both a resignation group o f companies and a non
resignation group o f companies.
Overall results from estimating the model suggest that the model was
significant for each o f the four quarterly time periods and that using information closer
to the event date increased the m odel’s explanatory power. In regards to the specific
independent variables, the results suggest that, for all quarterly time periods, firms are
more likely to resign from (1) clients who are smaller in size; (2) clients who are in
financial distress as modeled by a net loss; (3) engagem ents in which the tenure o f the
auditor is low; and (4) clients who are in industries in which the auditor has an

iii
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increasing and/or a relatively high market share. Additionally, companies that had a
greater likelihood o f management misrepresentation were also associated with an
increase in the likelihood o f a resignation; however, this association was sensitive to
time.

Specifically, this association was only significant in the two quarterly time

periods immediately prior to the event date. Overall, these results suggest that CPA
firms do respond to risk factors associated with the client and (such firms) are not
solely fixated on m onetary rewards.
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CH A PTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The traditional contractual relationship betw een the independent audit firm
(firm or auditor) and the client (company) begins w hen the company, via shareholder
approval, engages the independent auditor to provide certain assurances with respect
to certain financial statements o f the company.

In turn, this relationship ends when

either the com pany dism isses the auditor (dism issal) or when the auditor terminates
the engagement (auditor-initiated switch) by resigning (resignation) or declining to
stand for re-election (declination).
Research regarding dismissals, resignations and declinations is encompassed
within the broader research domain o f auditor switching.

To a large degree, prior

research in this dom ain has focused on switching in general— not auditor-initiated
switching. In regards to auditor-initiated switching, research to date has focused on
resignations versus declinations presumably due to

the greater frequency o f

resignations as opposed to declinations. C onsistent w ith research to date regarding
auditor-initiated switching, the focus o f this study is on resignations.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
In regards to resignations, there are three issues that have not yet been
addressed in the research to date. First, research has found that several variables are
associated w ith resignations. These include, but are not limited to, changes in the

l
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financial distress o f the client (Shu 2000), changes in the litigation risk borne by firms
(Shu, 2000) and the tenure o f the auditor (M enon and W illiams, 1999).

O f the

variables found significant in prior research, certain variables (e.g., change in financial
distress and auditor tenure) have yet to be evaluated concurrently in the same
explanatory model. Second, certain variables that have been shown to be significantly
different betw een switchers and non-switchers (e.g., auditor independence) have yet to
be evaluated in an explanatory model o f resignations. Third, the effect o f different
measurement dates prior to a resignation (versus a single date) have yet to be
evaluated. In order to gain additional insights regarding resignations, each o f the three
issues addressed above were incorporated into the m ethodology employed in this
study.

1.2 Objectives
There are two objectives o f this study:
1.

To develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations.

2.

To estim ate the model at several different quarterly dates immediately
prior to an event date so that the effects o f time on the explanatory
pow er o f the model and each independent variable can be ascertained.

1.3 Methodology
The structure o f this section on m ethodology is as follows. In general, Section
1.3.1 comments on model development. Section 1.3.2 describes the sources used to
collect data as well as the type o f data collected. Section 1.3.3 describes, in general,
how the data was analyzed in this study.
1.3.1

M odel Development. Models employed in prior research have focused

on different variables associated with the resignation decision. For example, Menon
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and W illiam s (1999) found that misrepresentations m ade by the client as well as the
expertise and tenure o f the auditor were important variables. In addition, Shu (2000)
found that a client’s degree o f financial distress as well as client’s associated with
high-tech industries were also important.

In addition to certain variables found

significant in prior research, the model developed in this study also included additional
variables theorized to be significant (i.e., not yet evaluated in the auditor resignation
context). These variables were included as the independent variables in a logit model
w hile the dependent variable was the resignation status (i.e., resignation or non
resignation).
1.3.2

Data Collection.

All publicly traded com panies are required by the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to report various types o f information
(filings) to the SEC. Filings include Form 10-K (annual report), Form 10-Q (quarterly
report), and Form 8-K (current report).

Compact D/SEC is a source o f data that

contains references to the SEC filings (filing reference) o f all com panies required to
make such filings. Information about each filing reference includes the type o f form
filed, the date o f the filing, and possibly other information specific to a particular
form.

The filing reference for Form 8-K (8-K) is critical to this study in that it

contains a numeric item num ber that is associated with the contents o f the actual 8-K.
The specific item num ber necessary for this study is item four because this item
num ber indicates that disclosures in the 8-K are related to an auditor switch.
Based on filing references contained in the July, 1996 to January, 2001
quarterly C om pact D/SEC discs (i.e., information pertaining to the period June 19961

1 June 1996 is the first full month in which 8-Ks for all public companies were required to be filed
electronically with the SEC and thus become part o f the publicly accessible Edgar database.
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to Decem ber 2000), a resignation group o f com panies was identified as follows. First,
a search for all filing references for all com panies during the period June, 1996 to
December, 2000 was performed. During this search process, all 8-K filing references
that also had a reference to an auditor switch (i.e. item four) were extracted to form an
auditor switching data set.

Second, the filing date o f each filing reference in the

auditor switching data set was used to locate the actual 8-K in Lexis-Nexis or Edgar.
Upon examination o f each 8-K, auditor switches that were resignations (verses
dism issals or declinations) were selected to form the resignation group o f companies
(i.e. resignation group).
Data for a control group was collected as follows.

First, a group o f non

resignation companies was formed by elim inating from the population o f companies
contained in Compustat any com pany that was part o f the resignation group.
Additionally, the non-resignation group was reduced further by elim inating companies
that did not report any total assets during the study period (i.e., total assets was used as
an indicator that financial information about the com pany was available) and by
elim inating all financial companies (i.e., com panies with SIC codes between 6000 and
6999). Second, a random sam ple o f the non-resignation group o f com panies that was
approxim ately the same size as the resignation group was extracted to form the control
group o f companies (i.e. control group).
Information for com panies in both the resignation and control group was
obtained from Compustat, Com pact D/SEC, or Lexis-Nexis.

For the resignation

group, the information consisted o f the most recent data prior to the resignation date.
Since the control group did not have a resignation date, a random date during the
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period under study was selected for each company.

Based on this random date,

information consisting o f the most recent data prior to the random date was used.
Thus, the event date for the resignation group was the actual resignation date disclosed
in the 8-K and the event date for the control group was a date chosen at random.
1.3.3

Data Analysis.

Logit estimation is an empirical technique used to

estimate models (i.e. logit models) that have a dichotomous dependant variable. Since
this study has a dichotom ous dependant variable (i.e. resignation vs. non-resignation),
a logit model was developed and estimated.

The results w ere used to explain the

occurrence o f resignations and to evaluate the association betw een the independent
variables and the dependent variable.

Initially, the model was estim ated using data

available on and before the last quarter-end date prior to the event date (i.e., the date o f
the occurrence o f the resignation, or for the control group, a random date).

This

estimation yielded information regarding the overall power o f the model to explain
resignations as well as information regarding the significance and explanatory power
o f the variables used in the model. The model was then re-estim ated based on data
available on and before the penultimate (i.e., next-to-last) quarter-end date prior to the
event date. This estim ation (i.e., one based on data relative to the penultim ate quarterend date) also yielded information regarding the overall explanatory pow er o f the
model as well as the significance and explanatory power o f the variables used in the
model. This process o f re-estimating the model was repeated until the model had been
estimated at four different points in tim e - once for each o f the four quarter-end dates
that immediately preceded the event date. The results o f these estimations were used
to evaluate hypotheses developed regarding each independent variable, to evaluate the
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overall explanatory power o f the model, and to evaluate the explanatory power o f each
independent variable. The evaluation o f the results o f the model was conducted both
at each point in tim e (i.e., at each quarter-end date) as well as across time.

1.4 Differences from Other Research
This study differs from research to date in four manners. First, variables have
typically been measured using annual data reported at the fiscal year-end (year-end)
immediately preceding a resignation (i.e., the event date). As a consequence, the time
interval between the date that each variable was measured to the event date could vary
widely.

For example, one company could report a resignation one month after the

year-end while a resignation for another company could be reported nine months after
the year-end. As a result, prior research has not m inim ized the effect that different
time intervals have on the resignation decision.

Consequently, the impact that

different time intervals have on the results o f prior research is unknown. In contrast,
this study utilized the most recent quarter-end data available prior to the event date to
measure the variables (verses the most recent annual year-end data).

This yielded

more consistent and tim elier information related to the resignation decision.
Second, prior research has used a single m easurem ent date (i.e., the year-end
immediately prior to the event date) for the independent variables used in estimating
models regarding the resignation decision. While using one measurem ent date prior to
the event date has been useful in identifying variables that are significant in the
resignation decision, the effects o f different measurement dates prior to the event date
on the significance o f the variables is unknown. Therefore, this study estimated an
explanatory model for several different measurement dates in order to determine the
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effects o f time on both the explanatory power o f the model as well as the explanatory
power o f the independent variables. Third, certain other independent variables used in
the auditor switching literature, but not previously used in the resignation literature
(e.g., auditor independence), were employed in this study.

And finally, the

m easurement o f certain independent variables (e.g., financial distress) differed from
that used in prior research.

1.5 Conclusion
An overview o f this study was provided in this chapter. The remainder o f this
study is arranged as follows. First, a review o f the literature relevant to this study is
provided in Chapter 2. Second, a discussion o f the m ethodology used is provided in
Chapter 3. Third, the results o f the study will be presented in Chapter 4. Finally, a
summary o f findings and a discussion o f the limitations and implications for further
research will be provided in Chapter 5.
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C H A PT E R II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Prior literature relevant to resignations can be classified into two general areas:
laws and regulations (pertinent to clients and firms) and academic research. There are
three sources o f laws and regulations that will be discussed: the SEC, the American
Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Professional Standards, and
Congress.

Until relatively recently, academic research has prim arily focused on

auditor switching as opposed to resignations. Since resignations are a sub-group o f
switchers, the research related to switching may provide information relevant to
resignations. Each o f the sources o f rules and regulations as well as academic research
related to switching and resignations are discussed in the following sections.

2.1 Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations
The Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 empowers the SEC to require companies
with publicly traded securities to periodically report information to the SEC.

In

general, companies that have publicly traded securities must file annual and other
periodic reports if they meet the follow ing two criteria: (I ) securities are held by more
than 500 ow ners, (2) total assets are greater than $10 m illion (SEC 2001). The 8-K is
one form that m ay be filed on a periodic basis.
The 8-K is required to be filed if any one o r more o f the events specified in
Table 2.1 occurred (unless a substantial part o f the inform ation that would be

3
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TABLE 2.1
Events Reported in Form 8-Ka
Description of Event
Item I : Changes in Control o f Registrant
Item 2: Acquisition or Disposition o f Assets
Item 3: Bankruptcy or Receivership
Item 4: Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant
Item 5: Other Eventsb
Item 6: Resignation of Registrant's Directors
Item 7: Financial Statements and Exhibits0
Item 8: Change in Fiscal Year
Item 9: Sales o f Equity Securities Pursuant to Regulation Sd

Maximum Time to File Report
15 calendar days after event
15 calendar days after event
15 calendar days after event
5 business days after event
N/A
5 business days after receipt of
resignation lener
60 calendar days after event
1S calendar days after date change is
made
N/A

1 T he above table presents, in sum m ary form, those events (Item s) that are required to be disclosed in Form 8-K.
A dditionally, the m axim um am ount o f tim e from the occurrence o f the event to the filing o f the 8-K is also
presented. Source: Form 8-K Instructions.
h R eporting other events is optional.
c Financial statem ents are only required in connection with an acquisition reported in Item 2.
Item 9 has been rem oved effective January 1, 1999.

contained in the 8-K has been previously reported in another form such as the 10-Q or
10-K). Table 2.1 also details the maximum amount o f tim e that can lapse from the
occurrence o f the event to the filing o f the 8-K.
m ultiple events in a single 8-K filing.

In addition, companies may report

As a result o f the 8-K filing requirements,

information relevant to investors is disclosed in the 8-K in a timely manner.
Certain disclosures contained in the 8-K will be a significant source o f
information that will be utilized in this study. Specifically, disclosures related to item
four (auditor switching) will be used to determine the type o f auditor switch that
occurred.

The remaining disclosures provided in the 8-K (i.e., those pertaining to

other item numbers) are not directly relevant to this study and, accordingly, will not be
discussed.
Specific disclosure requirements pertaining to auditor switching (i.e., item
four) are embodied in Item 304 o f the SEC Regulation S-K. These requirements state
that if the relationship between the com pany and their auditor has ceased, then the
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inform ation related to this change must be disclosed under item four o f the 8-K. In
general, the following m ust be disclosed with respects to the predecessor auditor.
First, the com pany must state whether the predecessor auditor resigned, declined to
stand for re-election or was dismissed. In addition, the date on which this occurred
must be disclosed. Second, the type o f opinion expressed by the predecessor auditor
during the two preceding years must be reported. If the opinion expressed was not a
standard opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion w ithout modifications) then a description
o f the specific reservations mentioned by the predecessor auditor must be disclosed.
Third, the company must state whether the decision to change auditors was
recom m ended by the audit committee or the board o f directors if the company has no
audit committee. Fourth, any disagreem ent betw een the predecessor auditor and the
com pany during the two most recent fiscal years m ust be disclosed.

In general,

disagreem ents are limited to those that pertain to accounting principles or practices,
financial statement disclosure, or auditor scope or procedure issues regardless o f
w hether the disagreement was resolved. Fifth, other conditions o f the company must
be disclosed as “reportable events” unless they have already been disclosed as a
disagreement. These include, but are not limited to, a condition where the predecessor
auditor acknowledged to the com pany that a lack o f internal controls exists that
prohibit the development o f reliable financial statem ents and a condition where the
predecessor auditor acknowledged to the com pany that it was unwilling to rely on the
representations o f management.

Finally, the com pany is required to supply the

predecessor auditor with a copy o f the com pleted 8-K on or before the day that it is
filed w ith the SEC. The company must request that the predecessor auditor review the
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8-K disclosures and provide the company w ith a letter stating w hether the predecessor
auditor agrees or disagrees with the statem ents made therein.

This letter from the

predecessor auditor is also required to be filed by the com pany to the SEC within ten
days from the initial filing o f the 8-K.
In summary, the SEC requires disclosures o f specified events as they occur
rather than requiring disclosures only on a quarterly or an annual basis. This increases
the value o f the disclosed information to investors because it is timely. The 8-K is the
form that is used to disclose information about certain changes (events) that occur
within a company.

The specific disclosures related to auditor switching will be a

significant source o f information that will be used in this study.

2.2 Professional Standards
The AICPA Professional Standards identify certain instances in which it would
be appropriate for an auditor to resign from an audit engagement.

Specifically,

guidance concerning auditor resignations can be found in the Statements on Auditing
Standards, the Code o f Professional Conduct and the Statem ents on Q uality Control.
Admittedly, such guidance was not designed to be all-inclusive.
2.2.1

Statements on Auditing Standards.

The Statements on Auditing

Standards identify several instances when it would be appropriate for the auditor to
resign from an audit engagement.

First, if the auditor concludes that it is not

practicable to modify audit procedures to sufficiently address the risk o f material
misstatement due to fraud, then the auditor should resign and com m unicate the reasons
for the resignation to the audit com m ittee or other corporate body w ith equivalent
authority and responsibility (AICPA, §AU 316.26 and §AU 316.36, 1998). Second,
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the auditor may discover during the performance o f the audit that an illegal act
occurred that has a m aterial impact on the financial statements. As a result, the auditor
should modify the audit opinion appropriately.

If the client refuses to accept the

modified report, then the auditor should resign and com m unicate the reasons for the
resignation to the audit committee o r other corporate body (AICPA, §AU 317.20,
1999). Third, if an illegal act is discovered during the course o f the audit and the
client does not take corrective action that the auditor deems warranted under the
circumstances, the auditor should resign even if the illegal act is not material to the
financial statements (AICPA, §AU 317.22, 1999). Fourth, if non-audited information
presented with the financial statements contains material inconsistencies with the
financial statements, the auditor should evaluate this information to determine if the
financial statements or the audit report should be revised. If the financial statements
do not require revision, the auditor should request that the client revise the non-audited
information.

If the client does not make the necessary revisions to the non-audited

information so that the material inconsistency is eliminated, then the auditor should
consider remedial actions.
include

an

explanatory

Remedial actions include revising the audit report to
paragraph

that describes

the

material

inconsistency,

withholding the use o f the audit report, and resigning from the engagement (AICPA,
§AU 550.04, 1996).
2.2.2

Code o f Professional Conduct. The Code o f Professional Conduct also

provides guidance related to two circumstances that would warrant the resignation o f
an auditor. First, if the auditor determ ines that he is not com petent and is unable to
gain sufficient com petence to com plete the audit engagement then the auditor should
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resign from the engagem ent (AICPA, §ET 201.02, 1999).

Second, if the auditor

believes that his independence has been impaired by actual or potential litigation (i.e.,
against the auditor by the client), the auditor should either resign, suspend the work on
the audit engagement until the m atter is resolved, or disclaim an opinion due to lack o f
independence (AICPA, §ET 101.08, 1999).
2.2.3 Statements on Q uality Control.

The Statements on Quality Control

require that firms establish and maintain a system that evaluates the decision to accept
or continue an audit engagement. The system policies and procedures encompassed in
making this decision should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the
integrity o f management is sufficiently high to warrant association with the client
(AICPA, §QC 20.14, 2000). Implicit in this decision m aking process is the idea that if
management lacks sufficient integrity, then the auditor should resign.
2.2.4 Sum m ary.

The AICPA has developed professional standards that its

members should follow when providing services to clients. In regard to resignations,
the Statements on Auditing Standards, the Code o f Professional Conduct, and the
Statements on Quality Control contain guidance that an auditor should consider when
evaluating a resignation decision.

2.3 Changes in the Legal Environment
The litigation risk associated with an audit engagem ent is significantly
influenced by the nature o f the legal environment.

The laws that govern such

litigation as well as their interpretation and use are an important com ponent o f this
risk. In recent years, new laws enacted by Congress have had an impact on litigation
that alleges violations o f securities laws. These new laws have impacted both the
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litigation risk bom by auditors as well as auditor disclosure and resignation
requirements.
2.3.1

Changes Affecting Litigation Risk. A significant law that was enacted to

decrease the level o f litigation risk associated with securities filed with the SEC is the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1995 (PSLRA). The primary motivation
for this legislation w as to reduce frivolous lawsuits that firms as well as other parties
(e.g., officers, directors, the company itself) faced.

Prior to the enactment o f the

PSLRA, firms involved in shareholder suits were liable jointly and severally, thus a
firm involved in such a suit could be forced to pay the full amount o f damages
awarded to the plaintiff regardless o f the degree o f fault that resided with the firm or
other defendants.

As a result, firms with perceived “deep pockets” were subject to

numerous frivolous suits. Even though most firms that went to trial would eventually
pay either a small am ount in damages or none at all, many firms responded to these
meritless suits by seeking a settlement rather than going to trial because, regardless o f
the merits o f the case, the costs associated with defending a suit were significant
(Palmrose 1994). W ith the enactment o f the PSLRA. joint and several liability was
replaced, in most cases, with proportionate liability if the firm has no knowledge that
security laws have been violated (violations). U nder proportionate liability, firms that
act “recklessly” (undefined in the law) but without knowledge o f violations are subject
to judgm ents that reflect their proportionate responsibility in the suit. However, firms
remain joint and severally liable if it can be shown that they knew o f violations that
would materially im pact the financial statements, but they did not take the appropriate
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action to disclose them (e.g., com m unications with the audit com mittee, board o f
directors, m anagem ent, or the SEC).
O ther provisions o f the PSLRA w ere also designed to decrease litigation risk.
In general, the safe harbor provision provides litigation protection for firms that allow
forward-looking statements to be included in the financial statements as long as these
statements are clearly identified. O ther provisions include limiting attorney’s fees to a
“reasonable” amount, prohibiting the use o f the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
O rganizations Act in civil cases involving securities fraud, increasing the amount o f
p roof required by a plaintiff, and elim inating certain abusive practices involving fees
paid to plaintiffs.

Given all the provisions in the PSLRA, the risk o f litigation

associated w ith issuing an audit opinion should decline; however, this is based on the
assumption that the law cannot be circum vented in some fashion.
For exam ple, upon the passage o f the PSLRA, lawyers began to evade this law
by bringing a number o f class action lawsuits in state courts, which the act did not
cover (G itenstein & Rothfeld 2001).

In order to counter this action by lawyers,

Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f 1998 (SLUSA).
The intent o f this legislation was to “prevent certain State private securities class
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objective o f the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1995” (Adm inistrative Procedure Act 1998).
Upon the passage o f this act, this “state loophole” in the PSLRA was closed.
Admittedly, other loopholes may exist.

Thus, the extent to which firms

perceive a reduction in their litigation risk as a result o f these new laws is contingent
upon the ability o f lawyers to bypass the intent o f these laws as well as how these laws
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are interpreted by a judge/jury in court cases. Som e o f the main objectives o f these
new laws appear to have been successful: frivolous cases are being dismissed,
settlements o f meritless cases appear to be diminishing, and the settlement value o f
cases with real merit is increasing (Gitenstein & Rothfeld 2001). However, King &
Schwartz (1997) note that the determination o f liable parties as well as the
apportionm ent o f fault is determined by a judge/jury. In this regard, the PSLRA gives
two factors that should guide a judge/jury in allocating responsibility: the nature o f the
conduct that contributes to the loss, and the nature and extent o f the causal relationship
between the conduct and damages. In spite o f these guidelines, the ultimate decision
lies with the judge/jury who may yet look to the “deep pockets” o f the firm when
making their decisions. Given that the SLUSA has only been enacted recently, the
true impact o f this law may not be observable at present. Therefore, firms m ay still
pay a greater amount in damages than their “ fair share.”
2.3.2

Changes Affecting Disclosure and Resignation Requirements.

PSLRA provided legislation directed towards auditors as well as other parties.

In

addressing auditors, the PSLRA does place a disclosure burden on auditors in the form
o f a “w histleblow er” provision.

Under this provision, if the auditor discovers the

possibility that an illegal act (act) occurred, regardless o f potential materiality, the
auditor is required to further assess the likelihood that the act occurred and the
possible effects on the financial statements.

If the act is deemed material, then the

auditor is required to communicate this inform ation to m anagement and the audit
com m ittee (or board o f directors if there is no audit com mittee). If after making this
communication, the auditor concludes that ( 1 ) the act continues to have a material
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effect on the financial statements, ( 2 ) senior management has not taken actions that are
both appropriate and timely, and that (3) this failure o f m anagem ent to address the
problem would result in a departure from a standard report o r a resignation, the auditor
should report these conclusions directly to the board o f directors, which should then
immediately notify the SEC. If within one day after this comm unication to the board
o f directors the auditor does not receive information that indicates that the board has
submitted the firm ’s conclusions regarding the act to the SEC, the auditor is then
required to report its conclusions directly to the SEC o r resign (and report the
conclusions to the SEC). If the auditor complies with these requirements, then they
will not be held liable in any private action for inform ation contained in the
conclusions reported to the SEC.
2.3.3

Summary.

With the enactment o f the PSLRA and the SLUSA, the

litigation risk faced by firms should be reduced. This reduction is prim arily due to the
replacement o f the joint and several liability method o f awarding damages to a
proportionate liability method. These laws also have direct effects on the disclosures
made by firms as well as guidance on when a firm should consider resigning from an
engagement.

2.4 Academic Literature - Switching
There are many studies in prior research that have investigated auditor
switching. Some studies have examined the audit opinion and switching (Chow and
Rice 1982, Krishnan 1994, Krishnan and Stephens 1995, K rishnan et al. 1996) as well
as switching and the pricing o f audit engagements (D eA ngelo 1981, Simon and
Francis 1988, Gregory and Collier 1996, W alker and Casterella 2000). O ther research

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

has sought to uncover variables associated w ith switching (D eFond 1992, DeFond and
Subramanyam 1998) and to determine what impact that sw itching has on stock returns
(Fried and Schiff 1981, Smith and Nichols 1982, Nichols and Smith 1983, Johnson
and Lys 1990, C arter and Soo 1999).
Prior research on switching (resignations being a part o f switching) may reveal
variables that m ay be associated with resignations. Specifically, variables that were
significant in studies that examined switchers and a control group o f non-switchers
prior to the switching event may also be significant when exam ining resignations and
a control group that did not resign.

Additionally, research related to the market

response o f switches may provide additional information relevant to this study.
2.4.1

Switchers vs. N on-Switchers.

A review o f switching studies was

performed to determine which variables have been consistently different between
switchers and non-switchers.

Based on this review, six studies were found that

investigated various aspects o f these two groups (i.e., switchers and non-switchers)
before the actual switching event (Chow and Rice 1982, W illiam s 1988, Haskins and
Williams 1990, Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al. 1996, DeFond and Subramanyam
1998). Table 2.2 provides a sum m ary o f the findings o f these studies. Overall, the
audit opinion has received the most attention and has been shown to be a variable that,
in most studies, distinguishes switchers and non-switchers.

Net income, financial

distress, client size, residual standard deviation from the standard market model, time
listed on stock exchange, client beta, audit firm industry dom inance, and a Big Six
(now Big Five) classification have also been shown to be im portant variables in two or
three studies.

Since the variables previously m entioned have been significantly
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TABLE 2.2
Studies Examining Switchers and Non-Switchers Prior to Switch3
Study
Chow and
Rice
1982
1973-1974

Williams
1988
1977-1982

Haskins and
Williams
1990
1985

Krishnan
1994b
1986-1987

Krishnan et al.
1996
1986-1988

DeFond and
Subramanyam
1998
1990-1993

Sample Years
Sample Size:c
149
116
Switchers
418 (8)d
186
197
503*
f
Non-switchers
9,042 (158)d
186
3,320
1,762
2,792
Variables:
Financial
*
+
0
Audit opinion1*
+
*
*
*
*
Net income
A
*
a
Financial distress
*
it
Size
a
0
Growth
*
Sales / assets
*
Accruals / assets
*
Cash flows / assets
Market related
*
*
Residual standard deviation
*
♦
Time
*
♦
Beta
Firm related
it
Firm dominance
*
0
♦
Big Six
Auditor tenure
*
Other
Change in management
*
Client negative publicity
*
Accruals/assets: (Net income before extraordinary items - operating cash flows) / total assets.
Audit opinion-. CR and W88 - 1 if modified, 0 otherwise; HW - 1 if unqualified, 2 if "subject to," 3 if nonconsistancy “except for," 4 if
disclaimer; K94 and K96 - 1 if unqualified, 2 if asset realization or litigation uncertainties, 3 if going concern.
Auditor tenure: Data was coded based on five year increments that predecessor auditor served client (i.e., 0, 5, 10, 15, 20).
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TABLE 2.2 continued
Beta: K94 and K96 - slope coefficient o f the standard market model regression.
Big six: K94 and K96 - 1 if a big six auditor, 0 otherwise. Pre-merger firms are included with post-merger firms.
Cash flows/assets: Operating cash flows / total assets.
Change in management: I if client changed president, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or treasurer during the two years prior to

switch.
Client negative publicity: 1 if client accused o f fraud, financial statement error, foreign bribe, or for issuing misleading financial information;

0 otherwise.
Financial distress: HW and K96 - Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; DS - Altman’s (1968) Z-score.
Finn dominance: W88 - firm’s industry market share based on sales and four-digit standard industrial classification code, HW and K96 -

same as W88 except results are generally based on a two-digit standard industrial classification code.
Growth: HW - percentage change in sales; K96 - 1 if client falls in the top quartile of growth rate of assets, 0 otherwise.
Net income: K94 and K96 - 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise; DS - net income before extraordinary items.
Residual standard deviation: K94 and K96 - residual standard deviation from a standard market model regression.
Sales/assets: Net sales / total assets.
Size: H W - net sales; K94 and K96 - natural logarithm o f the book value o f total assets deflated by the implicit price deflator for GNP.
Time: K94 and K96 - 1 if the company has been listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ for more than five years; 0 otherwise.___________
‘ Throughout this table the following abbreviations will be used: CR refers to Chow and Rice (1982), W88 refers to Williams (1988), HW refers to Haskins and Williams

(1990), K94 refers to Krishnan (1994), K9(> refers to Krishnan (199b), and DS refers to DeFond and Subramanyam (1998)
b 'Hie same data were also reported in Krishnan and Stephens (1995), therefore, that study is not presented in this table
‘ Sample size without parenthesis in CK is large because it is based on a Chi-squared test for independence o f classification. This test is based on counts of observations;
therefore, lack of financial and market data does not cause observations to be excluded DS doesn’t include market variables, which caused fewer observations to be excluded.
K94 and K9(> include market variables, which cause a reduction in the sample si/e as compared to DS. Differences between K94 and K9b sample sizes arc due to K9(> drawing
their sample from the September 1998 Disclosure Inc. disc while K94 drawing his sample from the March 1988 to March 1990 Disclosure Inc. discs. Data in W88 and HW arc
limited to intra-Hig eight switches only; however, W88 is also limited to clients that trade only on the NYSli or AMl-X while HW does not impose this restriction.
d The amounts in parenthesis denote a sub-sample of a larger sample denoted without parenthesis Analysis on the larger sample was conducted using a Chi-square test for
independence and analysis on the sub-sample was conducted using logistic regression.
c Due to data limitations, sample data for switcher's /-score was between 400 and 437 instead of 503
1 Actual number not reported.
* Prior to SAS No. 58, auditor’s issued 'qualified’ opinions when material uncertainties were present, whereas, after auditor's issued an unqualified opinion with modifications
(i.e., modified opinion). The current terminology will he used in this table unless otherwise noted
0 Variable was insignificant in univariate and multivariate analysis or unimportant in the recursive partitioning algorithm modeling technique.
1 Variable was significant at the .01 or 05 level in a multivariate analysis and univariate analysis The sign of the coefficient in the multivariate analysis is given.
* Variable was significant al the .01 or 05 level in a univariate analysis.
tt HW use a recursive partitioning algorithm modeling technique that doesn't base it’s results on conventional significance levels Variables that were found to be most
important arc included
* Variable significant in univariate analysis but insignificant in multivariate analysis.___________________________________________________________________________
rj
O
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different betw een switchers and a control group o f non-switchers, they may also be
significantly different between resignations and a control group that did not experience
a resignation. W hile the analysis in Table 2.2 was designed to illuminate variables
that have been significant in several studies regarding switchers and non-switchers,
variables that w ere significant in only one study m ay provide additional insights
regarding resignations as well.
2.4.2

M arket Reaction. The market reaction related to the date information is

thought to be released about switches (i.e., release date) has been examined in the
literature.

Several studies have found that there is no market response when the

release date is the

8

-K filing date (Johnson and Lys 1990, Schwartz and Soo 1996,

Carter and Soo 1999).

However, Fried and S chiff (1981) found a negative market

response, but subsequent tests in their study that w ere designed to determ ine the
underlying m otives to the negative response w ere not fruitful. In summarizing their
results, Fried and Schiff questioned the inform ation content o f the disclosure
requirements in spite o f the negative market reaction found. Other studies have used
the event date in the 8 -K disclosures (i.e., the actual date that the auditor change took
place) to test m arket responses. Schwartz and Soo (1996) study market responses to
switches based on the event date during the period 1988 to 1993 and find no
significant m arket response.

In contrast, C arter and Soo (1999) study the market

response to sw itches during 1993 and find a significant negative market response.
Given Carter and Soo’s (1999) limited study period, their findings may not be
generalizable to other periods.
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In contrast to studies that have focused on the m arket response at a release
date, other studies have examined the market reaction based on the disclosure or lack
o f disclosure o f disagreem ents between the client and auditor. Fried and S chiff (1981)
found no market response related to the disclosure o f disagreements. However, Smith
and N ichols (1982) com m ent that the sam ple size used by Fried and S chiff was too
small and m ay have biased their results. In other studies, Smith and N ichols (1982)
find a negative m arket reaction to the disclosure o f disagreem ents and Dhaliwal et al.
(1993) find that switches disclosing disagreem ents have a significantly low er market
reaction than switches that do not disclose any disagreements. Carter and Soo (1999)
suggest that both disagreements as well as resignations convey negative information to
the market. Therefore, part o f the negative market response found in prior research on
switching and disagreem ents may be related to resignations.
2.4.3

Sum m ary.

With respect to switching, prior research

related to

differences between switchers and non-switchers could provide insights to variables
that may be associated with resignations since resignations are a sub-group o f
switchers. Based on a review o f six studies, the audit opinion, net income, financial
distress, client size, residual standard deviation from the standard market model, time
listed on a stock exchange, client beta, audit firm dominance and Big Six classification
have been shown to distinguish switchers from non-switchers.

In addition, most

research has not found a market reaction related to switching when the switch is
disclosed; however, negative market reactions have been found related to the
disclosure o f disagreements.
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2.5 Academic Literature - Resignations
W hile most o f the prior research regarding auditor changes has focused on
auditor switching, several studies related to resignations have been written in recent
years.

The general areas that these studies have addressed can be categorized as

follows: differences between resignations and dism issals, determinants o f resignations,
and m arket reactions to resignations.
2.5.1

Differences Between Resignations and D ism issals. The SEC requires

that com panies delineate between resignations, declinations and dismissals in their 8 K disclosures (FRR No. 31). This delineation implies that the information content
related to these types o f auditor changes is different and meaningful to investors.
DeFond et al. (1997) provide evidence that resignations differ from dismissals.
Specifically, DeFond et al. (1997) find that resignations are associated with more
auditor-client disagreements and greater declines in com pany cash flows than
dismissals.

In contrast, Scholz (1996) finds that there were no distinguishing

characteristics between the two groups in the com puter industry.

Krishnan and

Krishnan (1997) find that resignations are associated with more reportable events
and/or disagreements disclosed in the

8

-K and that resignations are associated with

more clients that are in a greater degree o f financial distress than dismissals.

In

addition, resignations as opposed to dismissals are more likely to be associated with
clients that have been issued a modified opinion, less likely to have an auditor with a
long tenure, and are less likely to occur as the proportion o f revenues generated by the
client to the total revenues o f the firm increases. Raghunandan and Rama (1999) find
that Big Six (now Big Five) firms are less likely to serve as a successor auditor when
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the predecessor auditor had resigned rather than being dismissed. Shu (2000) finds
that resignations are associated with a greater change in litigation risk, a greater
likelihood o f a client being mismatched with their auditor (e.g., a client who should be
audited by a larger firm but the incumbent firm is small), and a greater likelihood o f
being associated with clients in high technology (high-tech) industries as defined by
the client’s standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
2.5.2

Determinants o f Resignations. Schroeder and Verreault (1987) conducted

an experimental study that was designed to determine the following: the variables that
influence resignations, the relative weight o f each variable, and w hether decision
makers (i.e., partners) in different sized firms weighed the variables differently. Their
results suggest that disagreem ents over fees, audit scope restrictions, management
integrity, disagreem ents over the application o f GAAP, and disagreem ents over the
audit report or opinion were the main variables that w ould lead a partner to consider
resigning from an audit engagement. Additionally, their results suggest that partners
o f both large and medium sized firms were consistent on ranking management
integrity and scope restrictions as the most important variables while partners o f small
firms ranked scope limitations and disagreements over the audit opinion as the most
important. Thus, partners in different sized firms do w eight the variables differently
(i.e., partners in different sized firms differ as to what w ould lead a partner to consider
resigning from an audit engagement).

Overall, management integrity and scope

restrictions were deemed the most influential variables.
Scholz (1996) finds that the most important variables associated with
resignations in the com puter industry were the existence o f modified audit opinions,
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the existence o f litigation either against the auditor or the client in general, and the
reliability o f m anagem ent. Scholz also concludes that market related information is
not widely used by auditors in evaluating clients.

This conclusion is based on a

review o f client continuance programs as well as conversations w ith audit partners.
Sholz states that “auditors argue that measures o f past volatility, which aggregate
market information across several years, are not useful in predicting precisely which
clients will eventually suffer the type o f price decline that will trigger an auditor
lawsuit.” This conclusion is consistent with the results o f Schroeder and Verreault
(1987) in that none o f the variables that the partners identified as important relied on
measures o f stock m arket volatility. In addition, Pratt and Stice (1994) find very little
support to the argum ent that auditor’s use the volatility o f a client’s common stock
when assessing litigation risk.
M enon

and

W illiam s (1999)

find that

firm-initiated

auditor changes

(resignations and declinations) can be partially explained by audit error cost. This cost
is the product o f the auditor’s assessment o f the likelihood o f client misrepresentation
(CM) and the expected losses to the firm that may result from the CM being
subsequently disclosed. In Menon and W illiams (1999), resignations and declinations
are modeled separately. In regards to resignations, the study finds that CM, low levels
o f firm expertise in the client’s industry and a shorter auditor tenure are likely to
increase audit error costs and increase the likelihood o f a resignation. In regards to
declinations, M enon and W illiams (1999) find that the results are sim ilar to that o f
resignations except that the level o f expertise and auditor tenure are insignificant.
Finally, another analysis is performed to determine the characteristics that differentiate
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resignations and declinations. The findings provide some evidence that firms are more
likely to resign, rather than decline renewal, when the tenure is shorter and the clients
are smaller.
Shu (2000) extends the literature by proposing and exam ining two competing
hypothesis regarding resignations. First, Shu proposes the litigation risk hypothesis,
which states that incumbent auditors are more likely to resign when they are exposed
to increased litigation risks. In order to test this hypothesis, Shu develops a litigation
prediction model and applies this model to data associated w ith a sample o f clients
whose firm had resigned and another sample o f non-switchers.

The result was a

composite measure o f the litigation risk faced by the auditor for each client. O ther
studies have developed litigation prediction models that could have been used to
calculate a com posite measure. Table 2.3 provides a sum m ary o f the variables that
prior research has shown to be significant in several litigation prediction models
including the model developed by Shu. In a subsequent analysis using the composite
measure, Shu finds that increases in the composite measure o f litigation risk were
associated w ith a greater probability o f a resignation; however, the direct effects that
each variable has, if any, on a resignation is unknown.
Second, Shu proposes the clientele-adjustment hypothesis, which states that
firms are more likely to resign when intra-firm decisions to m odify the criteria used to
establish and maintain their client-portfolio result in a client becom ing “mismatched”
with their auditor. In tum , Shu develops and implements a m ethodology to isolate the
mismatch condition.

The results suggest that the m ism atch condition is associated

with a higher probability o f a resignation. Additionally, Shu finds that increases in a
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TABLE 2.3
Summary of Litigation Risk Variables3
Carcello and
Palmrose
1991

Lys and
Watts
1994

Shu
2000
Litigation Risk Variablesc
Financial Variables:
Accrual/assets
0
Financial condition'
+
Financial leverage
+
0/ +
Inventory/assets
+
Net income
+
Probability o f acqusition
*tReceivables/assets
0
Return on assets
+
+/0
Sales growth
4+
-r
Size
Market Variables:
-rDelist status
0
Stock return
Stock turnover
+
0
Stock variability
Other Client Variables:
-r
Financial irregularity
-r
-/o
Independencef
-t0
Opinion
0
+
High-tech industry
-/O
Tenure
Accruals/assets: accruals to total assets.
D elist status: 1 if client was delisted fromCRSP due to financial difficulties in Year -<-1; 0 otherwise.
Financial condition: S91 - Altman’s Z score (Altman 1968).
CP - (i) Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index for non-financial companies. Sinkey et ai.’s
(1987) financial condition index for banks and (ii) 1 for net income and 0 for net loss.
LW - Ohlson's (1980) bankruptcy prediction model.
Financial irregtdarity: 1 if a SEC enforcement action exists against the client or its officers or
directors involving material omissions or misstatements in financial statements and disclosures
prior to bankruptcy: 0 otherwise.
Financial leverage: total liabilities / total assets.
Independence: LW - ratio o f client's sales to total sales o f all clients o f the auditor.
S91 - calculated as [1 - (ratio o f client’s sales to total sales o f all clients o f the auditor)].
Inventory/assets: S91 - inventory / total assets.
SOO - inventory I lagged assets.
Opinion: S91 - (i) I if the opinion on the financial statement before the earliest o f bankruptcy or
onset o f litigation was modified, 0 otherwise and (ii) 1 if the opinion on the last two financial
statements before bankruptcy were modified, 0 otherwise.
CP. LW & SOO - I if client received a non-standard audit opinion; 0 otherwise.
Net income: 1 if net income, 0 otherwise.
Probability o f acqusition: Palepu’s (1986) model.
Receivables/assets: S 9 1 - net receivables / total assets.
SOO - net receivables I lagged assets.
Sales growth : SOO and S 9 1 - rate o f change in sales from Year -1 to Year.
Size: CP, LW and SOO - natural logarithm o f total assets.
S91 - natural logarithm o f a clients market value.
Stock return: L W - stock return over Year -1 .
SOO - stock return over Year.
Stice
1991d
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TABLE 2.3 continued
Stock turnover, the proportion o f shares that were traded at least once over Year.
Stock variability: S91 - the variance o f abnormal returns.

SOO - standard deviation o f daily stock returns.
High-tech industry: 1 if client’s standard industrial classification code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s,

8730s, or between 3825 and 3839; 0 otherwise.
Tenure: 1 if audit tenure is more than three years, 0 otherwise.___________________________________
* Throughout portions o f this table the following abbreviations will be used to note the source of the litigation factor' SOI
refers to Stice (1091), CP refers to Carcello and Palmrose (1994), LW refers to Lys and Watts (1994), and SOO refers to Shu
(2000). In addition, only those variables that were significant in a multivariate analysis in at least one of the studies are
presented.
6 The sign listed gives the nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable; zero indicates that the
variable was insignificant.
c Litigation variables are given a brief description in this table if the factors are not self-explanatory. Additionally, the point in
time when the variables are measured relative to the date of litigation against the auditor is not consistent for each study,
therefore. "Year" will be used as a general reference point when needed. For more details regarding specitic calculations,
refer to the appropriate study
J A sign or zero to the left of the forward slash (i.e., '*/”) represent results of the litigation model when a control sample that
was matched on the year that the litigation took place was used. A sign or zero on the right of the forward slash represents
results using a control sample on industry and year.
' Lower values generated by the Altman (1968) Z-score used by S91 represent a poorer financial condition. Higher values of
the Ohlson (1980) model used by LW represent a poorer financial condition. LW reports an unexpected negative association
between financial condition and auditor litigation: however, LW do perform additional analyses and find that increases in the
probability of bankruptcy from the Ohlson (1980) model are associated with increases in auditor litigation.
' LW reports a positive relationship while S91 reports a negative relationship. This is due to LW calculating the importance
of the client to the firm (importance ratio) and S9I using a measure of auditor independence [1 - importance ratio |.________

client’s financial distress as well as client’s associated with high-tech industries also
increase the likelihood o f a resignation.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results o f m ultivariate models used in the resignation
studies reviewed in this section except for Schroeder and Verreault (1987) who did not
perform a m ultivariate analysis and Scholz (1996) whose study was limited only to the
computer industry. Each study has used resignations as the dependent variable and a
control group that consists o f non-switchers or a random set o f clients whose auditor
had not resigned. The results o f these studies are summarized below.
First, the results show that the integrity o f management, as modeled by client
misrepresentation (CM ), is an important variable such that increases in CM increase
the likelihood o f a resignation. The interaction terms o f CM and investment loss an
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TABLE 2.4
Summary of Determinants of Firm-Initiated Auditor Changes
Study*
Dependent Variable

Menon and Williams 1999
Resignation (1)
Non-switchers (0)
217(2,168)
1990-1996

Shu 2000
Resignation (1)
Random (0)b
269 (645)d
1985-1996

Sample Size0
Years
Independent Variables:
Client misrepresentation (CM)
CM * Investment loss
CM * Stock turnover
Firm market share
Size
Tenure
Change in financial distress
Change in litigation risk
Change in mismatch status
High-tech industry__________
Change in financial distress : Financial distress is based on a bankruptcy model mentioned only in the
footnotes of the study; however, the author reports that the results are similar to other probability of
bankruptcy models such as Zmijewski (1984). Change in this measure is based on the difference
between Year -3 to Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred.
Change in litigation risk: Litigation risk is a composite measure calculated using a litigation
prediction model developed in the study. Change in litigation risk is based on the difference
between Year -3 to Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred.
Change in mismatch status: 1 if the client and auditor have become mismatched between Year -3 and
Year -1 where Year refers to the year that the resignation occurred, 0 otherwise. The mismatch
status in a given year is based on the results o f a auditor size (i.e., large or small) prediction model
developed in the study. For example, if the model predicts that a client should be paired with a
large auditor in Year -3 and a small auditor in Year -1 while the client has continued to engage a
large auditor, then a change in the mismatch status is deemed to have occurred.
Client misrepresentation (CM): 1 if any one o f the following were detected prior to the date o f the
resignation: accounting errors/irregularities or debt covenant violations during the prior 12 months,
free-cash-flow deficiencies, or a high percentage o f insiders on the board o f directors; 0 otherwise.
CM * Investment loss: This variable is an interaction term between the existence o f client
misrepresentations and losses incurred by investors. Losses are calculated by first determining the
maximum price o f the client’s common stock over the six-month period ending nine months prior
to the date o f the firm-initiated change. Investors losses are calculated based on the return from this
maximum-price date to the date o f the firm-initiated change.
CM • Stock turnover: This variable is an interaction term between the existence o f client
misrepresentations and the turnover o f the client’s stock over a 250-day period preceding the date
o f the firm-initiated change.
Firm market share: The percentage o f total sales in an industry audited by a firm.
Size: Natural logarithm o f total assets.
Tenure: The number o f years that the predecessor auditor had been engaged to the client before the
firm-initiated change. This variable was capped at nine years.
High-tech industry: 1 if client’s three digit standard industrial classification code is 283, 357, 737,
873, or between the four digit standard industrial classification codes 3825 and 3839; 0 otherwise.
* To be included in this table, a study must have measured all o f the independent variables before the firm-initiated auditor
change date and used a control sample of non-switchers or clients whose auditors did not resign. Additionally, any sample
could not be limited to any one industry or group of related industries.
b Shu (2000) runs two separate logistic regressions. One uses resignations as the focus group and a random control group
while the other models resignations against other client-initiated changes. The results from the analysis using the random
sample are presented. This sample is described as a random sample of clients whose auditor did not resign.
c Numbers outside the parenthesis represent the number of resignations or declinations while those inside represent the
number of control observations (i.e., non-switchers or random).
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TABLE 2.4 continued
d Total observations of 914 were given in Table 5 of the study, but a breakdown between resignations and random samples
was not delineated. However, the resignation sample was stated to be 269 in the text prior to Table 5; therefore, the random
sample was calculated to be 645.
t Sign o f coefficient o f a variable that was significant at the .01 or .05 level.____________________________________________

stock turnover are also significant. However, the use o f m arket volatility data in the
resignation decision is questionable (see section 2.5.2).
Second, a firm ’s market share in an industry and a firm ’s tenure are also
important variables. A firm’s market share in an industry is theorized to be closely
related to the level o f industry expertise o f the firm. Consequently, given a high level
o f industry expertise, firm’s can use this expertise to low er their overall audit risk
through specialized audit procedures developed for a client. In a sim ilar fashion, the
greater the tenure o f the firm, the greater the client expertise. As a result o f increases
in industry and/or client expertise, the overall level o f audit risk is reduced. Therefore,
as the level o f expertise increases, the likelihood that an auditor will resign decreases.
The sign o f the m arket share variable (i.e., firm expertise) supports this conclusion.
Third, the size o f the client is another important variable. The variable used to
control for the size o f the client is significant and negative, which indicates that
resignations are m ore likely to occur with small clients rather than large ones.
Fourth, the change in a client’s financial distress, the change in a client’s
mismatch status and clients associated with high-tech industries are also important
variables.

Results show that the greater the financial distress (i.e., probability o f

bankruptcy) o f the client the greater the likelihood that a firm w ill resign. In addition,
changes in the client’s mismatch status as well as clients associated with high-tech
industries increase the likelihood o f a resignation.
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Finally, increases in the composite measure o f litigation risk increase the
likelihood that a resignation will occur. W hile the variables used to calculate litigation
risk are associated w ith actual litigation against auditors, the direct effect that these
variable have upon resignations is not known.
2.5.3

Stock M arket Reactions.

Defond et al. (1997) analyze excess returns

(i.e., stock market returns for a company less an overall m arket return for the same
period) for a sample o f resignations and dismissals that occurred during the period
1982 to 1987. For each resignation or dismissal that occurred during these years, the
excess returns were com puted over three time periods: pre-filing period (from the date
o f the auditor change to the date o f the

8

-K filing), post-filing period (from the

8

-K

filing date plus five business days), and a combined period (pre-filing period plus
post-filing period). Based on these excess returns, the results o f this study suggest that
the excess returns associated with resignations were significantly less than zero for all
three time periods, w hile the excess returns associated with dismissals were
significantly less than zero only during the post-filing period. In addition, the excess
returns for resignations and dismissals were found to be indistinguishable in the post
filing period.

Thus, the results o f this study suggest that the market only views

resignations as bad news in the pre-filing period indicating that there may be a
“ leakage” o f information regarding a resignation prior to the filing o f the 8 -K. Also,
during the post-filing period the market m akes no distinction between resignations and
dismissals and views them both as negative information.
Wells and Loudder (1997) analyze the abnormal returns (i.e., actual returns
less expected returns) associated with a sample o f resignations that occurred during
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the period 1988 to 1991. The expected returns were based on a 190-day estimation
period that ended ten days before the

8

-K filing date.

Expected returns were then

calculated for the two-day period that began on the day that the disclosure o f the
resignation was m ade public via the filing o f the 8 -K.

Results o f this study suggest

that companies do experience significant negative returns during this two-day period
when a com pany discloses that the incumbent auditors have resigned. An additional
test was perform ed to determ ine if other variables (i.e., the size o f the company, the
disclosure o f non-resignation information in the

8

-K, and the disclosure o f a specific

reason for the resignation in the S-K) caused the negative returns rather than just the
disclosure o f the resignation.

Results o f this additional test show that the other

variables had no impact on the negative returns. Furthermore, the results suggest that
the disclosure o f the resignation caused the negative returns.
Shu (2000) also finds a negative market reaction during a three-day window
around the filing date o f the resignation.

In addition, Shu (2000) suggests that

increases in litigation risk are associated with a larger decrease in stock price,
provided that the resignation occurs during the annual audit.
2.5.4

Sum m ary.

Prior research has shown that resignations differ from

dismissals, and that variables such as the change in a com posite measure o f litigation
risk and the change in the level o f financial distress are associated with an increase in
the likelihood that a firm w ill resign.

Given that som e o f the variables used to

determine the composite m easure o f litigation risk have not been modeled against
resignations directly, m odeling such variables along w ith other variables that have
been shown to influence a resignation may provide additional variables significant in a
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firm’s decision to resign. Finally, resignations have been shown to have a negative
impact on a com pany’s stock price.
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CHAPTER III

Methodology
The structure o f this chapter on m ethodology is as follows.
presents the developm ent o f the model.
collection that was employed.

Section 3.1

Section 3.2 describes the process o f data

Section 3.3 presents the data analysis technique that

was used to test the hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the time-varying aspect o f the
methodology. Section 3.5 presents a summ ary o f this chapter.

3.1 Model Development
Logit estimation is an empirical technique used to estimate models that have a
dichotom ous dependant variable. This technique has been used in prior research to
estim ate resignation m odels (M enon and W illiams 1999, Shu 2000). Similarly, this
technique was used in this study to gain increased insights regarding the variables that
distinguish companies w hose auditor resigns as opposed to companies w hose auditor
does not resign (i.e., a dichotomous dependent variable). The results were used to
determ ine the statistical relationship between the independent variables (measured at
time t) and the dependent variable.
developm ent o f each variable.

The rem ainder o f this section focuses on the

Specifically, each variable will be developed as

follows: general overview, findings o f prior research, statement o f hypothesis, and
m easurem ent specifications.

34
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3.1.1

High Technology Industry (TECH).

The industry in w hich a client

operates could, in itself, be an indicator o f an increase in risk that an auditor faces.
Specifically, clients in high technology related (high-tech) industries have undergone
significant growth and change in prior years.

In addition, the level o f competition

am ong industry participants has increased significantly. As a result, clients are under
pressure to meet earnings expectations. Consequently, the tendency for managers to
issue misleading financial statements m ay be greater than in other industries. Auditors
should be keenly aware o f these pressures and may adjust audit procedures to
com pensate for this increase in audit risk. Therefore, as auditors evaluate the increase
in audit risk associated with clients in a high-tech industry, some may consider the risk
to be too great and may, in turn, resign from the audit engagement.
Prior research has found that high-tech industries are generally associated with
a higher number o f occurrences o f fraudulent financial reporting (Loebbecke et al.
1989) and a higher level o f auditor litigation risk (Bonner et al. 1998, Shu 2000). In
addition, Shu (2000) finds that clients in high-tech industries increase the likelihood
that an auditor w ill resign. These findings support the theory previously presented and
lead to the following hypothesis:
Hi: Clients operating in high technology industries are positively related to the
probability o f an auditor resignation.
An indicator variable was used to denote if a client is in a high-tech industry.
Following Shu (2000), a client’s prim ary SIC w ill be used to determine whether the
client operates in a high-tech industry. Specifically, the indicator variable was set to
one if client’s SIC code was in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, or betw een 38253839; zero otherwise.
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3.1.2

Financial Distress (FDB. FP L . FDIY

An increase in the financial

distress o f a com pany is believed to increase the likelihood that managers will
manipulate financial statement information in an effort to shield themselves from
negative reactions from external parties (e.g., investors and creditors) as well as to
fulfill a m anager’s inherent self-interest (e.g., increased com pensation where
compensation is based on financial statem ent information). As a result, the likelihood
that financial statem ent manipulation will go undetected increases and, in turn, the
likelihood o f the firm attesting to misleading financial statem ents increases.
Consequently, this can lead to lawsuits against the auditor. Stated another way, an
increase in the financial distress o f a com pany is likely to be positively associated with
a firm’s risk o f litigation. As a result, the auditor is likely to consider this increased
risk when evaluating the decision to continue or resign from the audit engagement.
In prior research, the financial distress o f a company has been proxied by the
presence o f a net loss (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984, Carcello and Palmrose 1994,
Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al. 1996) and by the probability o f bankruptcy (Haskins
and W illiams 1990, Stice 1991, Lys and Watts 1994, Krishnan et al 1996, DeFond and
Subramanyan 1998, Shu 2000). Som e o f the results from these studies suggest that
the presence o f a net loss is a distinguishing characteristic between switchers and non
switchers (Krishnan 1994, Krishnan et al 1996) and it is positively related to litigation
against auditors (Carcello and Palm rose 1994). In addition, St. Pierre and Anderson
(1984) find that a net loss that followed periods o f net income increased the likelihood
o f litigation against the auditor. O ther results o f these studies show the probability o f
bankruptcy to be a distinguishing characteristic between switchers and non-switchers
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(Haskins and W illiams 1990, Krishnan et al 1996, DeFond and Subramanyan 1998).
In addition, results suggest that the probability o f bankruptcy is positively related to
resignations (Shu 2000) and to litigation against auditors (Stice 1991).

In contrast,

Lys and W atts (1994) report an unexpected negative relationship between the
probability o f bankruptcy and an auditor’s litigation risk.

However, in subsequent

analyses the authors do find a positive relationship. O ther results also show that when
both the presence o f a net loss and the probability o f bankruptcy were modeled
together in a multivariate analysis regarding litigation against auditors, the presence o f
a net loss was shown to be positively related to litigation against auditors while the
probability o f bankruptcy w as insignificant (Carcello and Palmrose 1994).
In summary, the results o f prior research suggest that the presence o f a net loss
and the probability o f bankruptcy are characteristics that distinguish switchers from
non-switchers.

In addition, results suggest that the presence o f a net loss and the

probability o f bankruptcy are positively related to an auditor’s litigation risk if these
two variables are not included in a model simultaneously. W hen both variables are
included in a model, results suggest that the presence o f a net loss is positively related
to litigation against auditors w hile the probability o f bankruptcy is not significant.
Further, results suggest that the probability o f bankruptcy is positively related to
resignations.

Based upon prior research, this study theorizes that both m easures o f

financial distress are positively related to resignations.
This study employed both the probability o f bankruptcy as well as the presence
o f a net loss as indicators o f financial distress. First, in general, the probability o f
bankruptcy was used to create a more comprehensive m easure o f financial distress
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than measures used in prior research (FDB). Second, in general, the presence o f a net
loss was also used as an indicator o f financial distress (FDL).

Furthermore, the

presence o f a net loss that followed periods o f net incom e was used to measure a
“surprise” factor associated with financial distress (FDI)-

The use o f a “surprise”

factor based on the presence o f a net loss also differs from prior research. Therefore,
the following three relationships are hypothesized:
Hi: An increase in the financial distress associated with the probability o f
bankruptcy is positively related to the probability o f an auditor
resignation.
H 3 : An increase in the financial distress associated with the presence o f a net
loss is positively related to the probability o f an auditor resignation.
H4 : An increase in the financial distress associated with the presence o f a net
loss following periods o f net income is positively related to the probability
o f an auditor resignation.
The remainder o f this section provides the specific details regarding the calculation o f
both measures o f financial distress.
In regards to using the probability o f bankruptcy to proxy for a com pany’s
financial distress, Zm ijew ski’s (1984) bankruptcy m odel was used.

Bam ber et al.

(1993) note that this bankruptcy model, as opposed to others, is more useful because
the coefficients o f the model were given in the study, it yields a standard normal
variable than can be converted into the probability o f bankruptcy rather than yielding a
dichotomous classification, it was constructed based on a broad range o f industries and
types o f com panies, and it is parsimonious (i.e., uses only a few variables to obtain a
large explanatory pow er).

This bankruptcy m odel has also been shown to yield

similar results w hen compared to other bankruptcy m odels that were estimated with
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data in recent years (Shu 2000). Therefore, the financial distress associated w ith a
client's probability o f bankruptcy was calculated as follows:
FDB = CFD * IFD
where:

CFD = - ^ ~
PB<,
and
IFD =

PB,
IPB,

The com position o f the financial distress m easure associated with the
probability o f bankruptcy (FDB) incorporates a change in a client’s probability o f
bankruptcy betw een two points in time (CFD) along with the relative disparity
between the client’s probability o f bankruptcy and the average probability o f
bankruptcy in the client’s industry (IFD). In deriving the financial distress measure,
let t represent a quarter-end date.

Therefore, CFD is the ratio o f the client’s

probability o f bankruptcy at time t (PB, ) to the probability o f bankruptcy that existed
two years prior to PBt [PBt ).

Thus, values o f CFD larger (sm aller) than one

represent an increase (decrease) in the probability o f bankruptcy. IFD is the ratio o f
the client’s probability o f bankruptcy at tim e t to the average probability o f bankruptcy
at time t for all com panies in the client’s industry (IPBt). Thus, larger (smaller) values
o f IFD represent an increase (decrease) in the probability o f bankruptcy o f the client
over the average probability o f bankruptcy o f a com pany in the client’s industry.
Therefore, by taking the product o f the change in the client’s probability o f bankruptcy
(CFD) and the client’s probability o f bankruptcy as com pared to the industry average
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(IFD), larger (smaller) values o f FDB correspond to an increase (decrease) in the
financial distress o f a client and, in tum , a greater (lesser) likelihood o f a resignation.
FDB is a client-specific m easure that is believed to im pact a firm’s decision to
resign.

However, a client’s probability o f bankruptcy is not included as a separate

com ponent (i.e., it is not a separate component along w ith CD F and IDF). If firm’s
use the probability o f bankruptcy as a separate com ponent in the resignation decision,
it is assum ed that they would compare this m easure to som e predetermined firm
threshold that would apply to all o f their clients (e.g., all clients with a probability o f
bankruptcy greater than .70). Thus, financially distressed clients beyond some firm
threshold would be subject to a resignation. W hile financially distressed clients that
are subject to this “threshold” criterion may be dispersed am ong various industries, it
is more likely that m any o f these clients are concentrated in industries that have
experienced a significant economic downturn.

As a result, firms that use this

“threshold” criterion would, in general, be transitioning out o f an industry.

Firm

movements o f this nature, generally referred to a m ism atch, are discussed later in
section 3.1.6.
In regards to a net loss, other dimensions o f financial distress may include the
simple presence o f a net loss and/or the presence o f a net loss that is preceded by
periods o f net income. In regards to the simple presence o f a net loss, prior research
has shown that the presence o f a net loss was significant in switching studies (see
section 2.4.1). As a result, the presence o f a net loss prior to the event date will be
included in this study. Specifically, an indicator variable (FD L) will be set to one if a
company experienced a annual net loss at time t where the annual net loss is defined as
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the sum o f each quarterly net income amount im m ediately prior to and including time
t. If the previous condition is not met, the indicator variable will be set to zero. In
regards to the presence o f a net loss that is preceded by periods o f net income, prior
research has found that when an unexpected net loss occurs after years o f net income,
the risk o f litigation against the auditor increases (see the prior research part o f this
section).

Thus, this “surprise” factor may also be associated with an increase in

auditor resignations. Specifically, an indicator variable (FDI) will be set to one if an
annual net loss w as observed at time t and if this loss immediately followed two years
o f annual net income for the periods M and t-2 w here t-\ represents a time one year
prior to t. The indicator variable will be set to zero if the preceding condition is not
met.
3.1.3

A uditor Tenure (TEN).

The tenure o f an auditor is theorized to be

inversely related to auditor changes because during the early part o f an auditor’s
tenure the auditor is seeking to develop client-specific expertise so that efficiencies in
information gathering and evaluation can lead to an improved service that benefits the
auditor, the client, and the public. However, during this client-expertise development
period, the auditor faces a higher risk o f audit failure because there is an increased risk
that errors and/or irregularities will go undetected due to the unfamiliarity w ith the
client.

In fact, research has shown that in instances where material misstatements

were detected, approximately 45% were detected during the first three years o f the
tenure o f the auditor (Loebbecke et al. 1989). St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) also
note that firm ’s face a greater amount o f litigation risk in the first three years o f an
audit engagement. Therefore, given a higher risk o f audit failure during the early part
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o f their tenure, the auditor, in turn, also faces a greater risk o f litigation. As a result,
the auditor must evaluate both the risk o f audit failure and the corresponding litigation
risk during the early part o f the auditor-client relationship. If the auditor concludes
that these risks are too great, the firm may resign.
Prior research has supported the theorized association between auditor changes
and auditor tenure. Specifically, auditor tenure has been inversely related to auditor
changes (W illiams 1988) as well as firm-initiated auditor changes (M enon and
Williams 1999). Thus a change in auditor is more likely to occur during the first part
o f an auditor’s tenure. Therefore, this leads to the following hypothesis:
H 5 : The tenure o f the auditor is negatively related to the probability o f an
auditor resignation.
To operationalize auditor tenure, a variable w ill be constructed that will
contain the number o f years that the incumbent auditor has been retained by the client.
3.1.4

Auditor Independence (INDEPT

The independence o f the auditor is a

core element in the process o f attesting to a client’s financial statements.

In this

regard, an important issue is at what point does the client’s importance to the firm
impair the firm’s independence (Goldwasser 2001). A client could becom e important
to a firm if the audit fees paid by the client represent a significant portion o f the total
revenue o f the firm (Stice 1991). Therefore, an important client could exert influence
on the auditor to attest to financial statements that the auditor knows are misleading.
Thus, the mere size o f the audit fees relative to the firm ’s total revenue could give the
client enough influence that could impair the auditor’s independence.
A measure o f auditor independence for a client could be generated by dividing
a client’s audit fees by the total audit fees earned by a firm during a given period.
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Thus, low values w ould indicate that a firm w as not dependent on the fees o f the client
and the firm could be considered independent. However, audit fee data has not been
reasonably attainable. As a result, research has developed an alternative measure o f
auditor independence that is based on using a clien t's revenues as a surrogate for audit
fees (Stice 1991, Krishnan and Krishnan 1997).

Krishnan and K rishnan (1997)

examine a sample o f resignations and dismissals and found that the independence o f
the auditor was a significant variable in that differentiated resignations from
dismissals.

Stice (1991) exam ines lawsuits against auditors and finds that when a

year-matched control sample is used, auditor independence is significant and inversely
related to the likelihood o f the auditor being sued. Thus, a higher level o f auditor
independence is associated w ith a lower level litigation risk.

However, when an

industry-year m atched control sample is used, the independence o f the auditor
becomes insignificant.

Stice concludes that industry characteristics play a role in

determining variables associated with litigation against auditors.

To control for

certain industry effects, this study includes an indicator variable that is set to one if a
client is in a high-tech industry, which has been shown to be associated with a higher
degree o f litigation risk (see section 3.1.1).
In regards to auditor independence and resignations, it follows that auditors
with a low (high) level o f independence would have a lower (higher) propensity to
initiate a resignation.

By contrast, extending the findings in Stice (1991) to

resignations, one would conclude that an high (low) level o f auditor independence
would result in a low (high) level o f resignations because o f low er (higher) litigation
risk. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that more resignations would occur
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given that firms are m ore dependent on a client’s audit fee (i.e., less independent).
Therefore, a positive association between auditor independence and resignations is
theorized to exist, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H6: The independence o f the auditor is positively related to the probability o f
an auditor resignation.
Both Stice (1991) and Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) compute the level o f
auditor independence based on the following formula which w ill be used in this study:

in d

,

CR„
= i — r - 2-

S « .
/ =l

where:
i
= 1,2,...,! for all firms
j
= 1 , 2 , . . . , J for all clients
rND,j = the level o f auditor independence between client j and firm i
CRtJ = revenues o f client j audited by firm i
Several limitations regarding this formula are noted by Krishnan and Krishnan
(1997). First, the formula assumes that audit fees are a determ ining factor in the level
o f auditor independence and that a client’s total revenues are a surrogate for audit fees.
Second, a better measure for the denominator would be the total profits derived by the
firm.

Finally, when this formula has been employed in research the total revenues

from all clients in the denom inator has not included revenues from non-public clients.
In regards to the first limitation, the use o f a client’s total revenues may not be
as great a limitation as mentioned in Krishnan and Krishnan (1997). A client’s total
revenue may be a better indicator o f total fees paid by the client (audit and non-audit)
rather than audit fees alone. As a result, total fees may have a greater correlation to
auditor independence than audit fees alone.
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3.1.5

C om pany Size (SIZE). The size o f the client has implications in regards

to ( 1 ) the size o f judgm ents or settlements (awards) associated with a lawsuit, ( 2 ) the
likelihood o f audit failure and (3) the importance o f the client to the auditor. First, the
larger the client the larger the potential awards associated w ith a lawsuit, and,
accordingly, the larger the litigation risk. As a result o f increases in litigation risk, the
likelihood o f an auditor resignation is also theorized to increase. Second, larger clients
have more complex organizational and information infrastructures that make the audit
process more com plex and more prone to audit failure. Consequently, more complex
clients are theorized to be associated with an increase in resignations. Third, the fees
paid by a large client m ay represent a significant portion o f the firm ’s revenues. As a
result, the firm may be reluctant to resign in spite o f concerns over litigation risk or
concerns over increased audit risk associated with a m ore complex client. Thus, the
overall theorized effect o f the size o f the client and resignations is not clear.
Prior research finds that an increase in the size o f the client is associated with
an increased level o f litigation against a firm (Stice 1991, Lys and Watts 1994,
Carcello and Palmrose 1994, Shu 2000).

W hile Shu (2000) finds a positive

association between client size and auditor litigation, the study also notes that the
mean client size associated with resignations was significantly lower than a control
group. A sim ilar finding is present in Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) who state that
auditor’s m ay be “more reluctant to resign from large clients than small ones (without
regard to litigation risk).” In fact, in a study o f resignations and non-switchers, Menon
and W illiams (1999) find that the size o f the client is negatively related to
resignations. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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H 7 : The size o f the client is negatively related to the probability o f an auditor
resignation.
To model the effect o f client size, a variable containing the natural logarithm
o f the client’s total assets was used.
3.1.6

Client-Firm Mismatch (M ISM ). The auditing industry has undergone

many changes. These include, but are not limited to, changes in technology and an
increase in non-audit services. The impact o f these two changes on firms has been
amplified due to an increase in the level o f competition for audits and the inability o f
firms to generate more revenues from audit engagements. As a result, many firm’s
production functions have become more cost efficient and a greater number o f firms
have devoted more resources towards the developm ent o f non-audit services.
Consequently, firms have modified their desired portfolio o f clients. This change in
the portfolio o f clients has resulted in firms increasing their m arket share in industries
that are m atched with their core competencies and reducing their market share in
others that are not. Thus, as a firm transitions out o f an industry, a client may become
associated with a firm that maintains a low involvement in the client’s industry (i.e.,
the client’s industry has over time become outside the core com petency o f the firm).
Thus, another firm m ay better serve the client, and hence, the client-firm alignment
has become mismatched. While a mismatched client may eventually dismiss the firm
that performs their audit, it is also possible that a firm will decide to resign.
W ith respect to client mismatch, no prior research known to the author exists
expect for Shu (2000).

In this regard, Shu (2000) extends prior research by

developing a m ethodology to determine if a client is m ism atched with its current firm
(mismatch status), and whether a change in the client’s m ism atch status is associated
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with a resignation.

While Shu finds a significant positive association between the

change in m ism atch status and resignations, the m ethodology developed to determine
the mismatch status is only designed to predict mismatches that occur between large
and small firms.

M ismatches that occur between the same size firms are not

considered. In other words, a client mismatched with a large firm that may be better
aligned with another large firm is not considered. This omission is important because
Shu also reports that 46% o f the resignation sample represented changes between large
firms and 20% were between small firms. Therefore, given that

6 6

% o f the auditor

changes that occurred in the resignation sample were within the same firm size
category, a significant number o f mismatches may not have been detected.

To

compensate for this limitation as well as to identify mismatches in general, this study
employs the use o f an alternative m ethodology based on a firm ’s market share in an
industry.
The alternative methodology is based on prior research that has examined the
issue o f firm market share concentration in client industries (firm concentration).
Eichenseher and Danos (1981) find evidence o f firm concentration in specific
industries, but in a smaller subset o f industries they find that the firm concentration
had not changed significantly during the period 1964 to 1975. Danos and Eichenseher
(1982) find that the firm concentration o f larger firms tended to deteriorate over the
period 1972 to 1979 in nonregulated industries; whereas this deterioration did not take
place in industries that were regulated. In a later study, Kwon (1996) finds evidence
that industries dominated by relatively few companies (high com pany concentration)
will exhibit a lower level o f firm concentration than those industries that have a larger
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num ber o f companies that operate in them. Kwon concludes that this situation arises
because companies in a high company concentrated industry will be concerned about
the leakage o f proprietary information. Therefore, they would not w ant to engage a
firm who also audits one o f their competitors. As a result, Kwon concluded that a
higher com pany concentration in an industry reduces the likelihood o f a high firm
concentration.

W hile the results in Kwon (1996) were based on a cross-sectional

study using data in 1989, Hogan and Jeter (1999) perform ed a longitudinal study and
find that industries that have a higher com pany concentration w ere associated with
higher levels o f firm concentration.

In addition, they find that firm concentration

levels increased during the period 1976 to 1993 in both regulated and nonregulated
industries. Furthermore, firms that were classified as having a high firm concentration
in an industry increased their market shares over tim e while those firms with a will
low firm concentration in an industry found that their market shares had declined.
In general, the changes in firm concentration result from intra-firm decisions
that are influenced by the market for accounting services. As these changes occur, the
firm adjusts its portfolio o f clients so that its clients would benefit from the firms
existing or developing core competencies and the firm w ould benefit through
increased profits and other non-financial benefits (e.g., enhanced

reputation).

Consequently, as firms reallocate resources over tim e to facilitate these decisions,
some existing com panies will become associated w ith a firm that has a low market
share in the client’s industry, or, in other words, the client and firm are mismatched.
G iven a mismatch, a client is more likely to experience a change in auditor (i.e., a
resignation or dismissal).

This does not imply that all mismatches will result in a
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change in auditor. If the client-firm relationship is still mutually beneficial, then the
engagement is likely to continue. However, if the beneficial nature o f the relationship
changes, then a change in auditor is likely to occur.
To determ ine the association between the mismatch status and resignations, the
following hypothesis is proposed.
Hg: The degree that client-firm alignments are mism atched is positively
related to the probability o f an auditor resignation.
The developm ent o f this hypothesis is designed to detect mismatches where a
firm resigns as a result o f the decision to reallocate resources to a different mix o f
clients because the benefits associated with the new clients are greater.

The

calculation o f the variable used to proxy for this hypothesis was based on the
following firm market share formula provided in Hogan and Jeter (1999):

MSit

=

"

ijk
1=1

j-\

where:
i = 1 , 2 ...... 1 for all firms
j = 1,2,...,J for all clients
k = 1 ,2 ,...,K. for all industries
Ik = the num ber o f firms in industry k
Jik = the num ber o f clients served by firm i in industry k
Ajjk= total assets o f client j in industry k by firm i
The degree o f mismatch that exists betw een a client and firm was calculated as
follows:
M ISM = ---------------R M S * IMS
where:
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The composition o f the degree o f mismatch (M ISM ) incorporates a change in
the m arket share o f the client’s audit firm between two points in tim e (RM S) along
with the relative disparity o f the firm ’s market share as compared to that o f the firm
with the dom inant market share (IM S).

In deriving the mism atch m easure, let t

represent a quarter-end date and let T represent the most recent fiscal year-end prior to
t. Therefore, RMS is the ratio o f the market share o f the client’s audit firm at the most
recent fiscal year-end prior to t (MSikr) to the market share o f the client’s audit firm
that existed on the fiscal year-end two years prior to M Sikr {MSikr ). Thus, values o f
RMS sm aller (larger) than one represent a decrease (increase) in market share. IMS is
the ratio o f the market share o f the client’s audit firm to the highest m arket share o f an
audit firm in the client’s industry both measured at time T (HM Sikr). Thus, smaller
(larger) values o f IMS indicate that there is a larger (sm aller) disparity betw een the
market share o f the client’s audit firm and the dominant firm in the industry. Given
that firms with smaller market shares, relative to other firms in an industry, will
encounter declines over tim e in their already low market shares (H ogan and Jeter
1999), a sm aller IMS would increase the likelihood that the client and firm were
mismatched. Therefore, by taking the inverse o f the product o f RMS and IMS, high
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(low) values o f M ISM represent a higher (lower) degree o f m ism atch that exists
between the client and firm.
3.1.7

M anagem ent M isrepresentation (MR). W ithin the AICPA Professional

Standards, the Statements on A uditing Standards as w ell as the Statements on Quality
Control address issues where an auditor should resign if the integrity o f managem ent
is considered too low to warrant association with a client (see sections

.

2 2 .1

and

2.2.3). Although not specifically mentioned in the professional standards, four factors
that might be an indicator o f low management integrity that m ight lead to fraudulent
financial reporting are a prior disclosure o f irregularities, a deficiency in cash-flow, a
prior disclosure o f debt covenant violations, and a high percentage o f officers on the
board o f directors (M enon and W illiams 1999).

A dditionally, disclosed errors that

cause the financial statem ents to be materially m isleading m ay indicate a lack o f
sufficient internal controls or a lack o f enforcing existing internal controls. In either
case, disclosed errors are indicative o f a weak system o f internal controls that increase
the likelihood o f audit failure. Given the presence o f one o r more o f these factors, an
auditor may be more inclined to resign from an audit engagement.
Prior research regarding the factors previously mentioned has shown that they
are associated with a significant positive relationship w ith resignations (M enon and
W illiams 1999). Specifically, M enon and W illiams (1999) com bine these factors into
a single measure (an indicator variable) when testing the effects on resignations (see
table 4). This leads to the following proposed hypothesis:
H 9 : Clients w hose m anagem ent is considered to have a higher likelihood o f
issuing m isleading financial statements are positively related to the
probability o f an auditor resignation.
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Following M enon and Williams (1999), an indicator variable will be
constructed to indicate that the management o f the client has a higher likelihood o f
issuing misleading financial statements. Specifically, this variable will be set to one if
any o f the following four conditions are met.

First, if errors or irregularities were

disclosed during the twelve months prior to t.

Second, if debt covenant violations

were disclosed during the tw elve months prior to t. Third, if the client is experiencing
free-cash-flow deficiencies as defined by the following formula:
O C F - A C E , ,0,
FREEC = ------ -----------

In the formula above, O CFt represents the operating cash flows for the four quarters
prior to and including t.

ACE, jIof ( represents average capital expenditures for the

three year period ending one year prior to t (i.e., ACE, ).

CA, represents current

assets one year prior to t. FREEC represents a continuous m easure o f ffee-cash flows.
The indicator variable was set to one if the value o f FREEC is less than -.5. Fourth, if
the percentage o f officers on the board o f directors is greater than 67%. If any o f the
above four conditions are not met, then the indicator variable will be set to zero.
3.1.8

Legislation (LEG98).

The litigation risk associated with an audit

engagement is significantly influenced by the nature o f the legal environment. The
laws that govern such litigation as well as their interpretation and use are an important
component o f this risk. W ith the enactment o f the PSLRA in December, 1995 and the
SLUSA in November, 1998, the litigation risk faced by firms should be reduced. This
reduction is prim arily due to the replacement o f the jo in t and several liability method
o f awarding dam ages to a proportionate liability m ethod (see section 2.3).
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Prior research supports the theorized reduction o f litigation risk faced by firms.
Gitenstein and Rothfeld (2001) find that frivolous cases are being dismissed and
settlements o f m eritless cases appear to be diminishing.

G eiger and Raghunandan

( 2 0 0 1 ) find that in an analysis o f bankrupt companies, auditors were less likely to
issue a going-concem modification in an audit report after the passage o f the PSLRA
in 1995 than before.

However, the effects o f the SLUSA, if any, have not been

investigated in any prior research known to this author.

Therefore, the following

hypothesis is proposed with respect to resignations:
Hio: The passage o f the SLUSA o f 1998 reduced an auditor’s litigation risk
and is negatively related to the probability o f an auditor resignation.
To model the effect o f the passage o f the SLUSA, an indicator variable will be
set to one for years subsequent to the passage o f the legislation and zero otherwise.
3.1.9

Firm Size (BIG5). In maintaining a portfolio o f clients, firms generally

develop a set o f client continuance criteria that will aid the firm in meeting their
overall objectives (e.g., profitability, portfolio risk level, and industry market share).
During or at the conclusion o f the client continuance evaluation process, firms may
decide to resign from some engagements. However, the continuance criteria m ay be
different for Big 5 firms as opposed to non-Big 5 firms. Specifically, Big 5 firms may
be in a better position to be more selective in establishing and maintaining their
continuance criteria because o f the greater number o f clients in their portfolio o f
clients. As a result, Big 5 firms may be more likely to resign than non-Big 5 firms . 2
In turn, the following hypothesis is provided.

2 Prior research has found that there is a negative relationship between the size o f a firm (i.e.. Big 5
versus non-Big 5) and the occurrence o f an auditor switch (Krishnan et al. 1996). Specifically, clients
o f Big 5 firms are less likely to switch than those o f non-Big 5 firms. However, three factors need to be
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H u '. The size o f the firm (i.e., Big 5) that audits a com pany is positively related
to the probability o f a resignation.
To operationalize this hypothesis, an indicator variable w ill be constructed that
will be set to one if the company is audited by a Big 5 firm and zero otherwise.
3.1.10 Summary. The following logit model includes all the variables previous
discussed in this section.
RESIGN = b0 + biTECH + b: FDB + b3FDL + b4FDI + b5TEN + b6INDEP
+ b7SIZE + b8MISM + b9M R + b i0LEG98 + b n BIG5 + e
where,
RESIGN = 1 for clients whose auditors resigned; 0 otherwise;
TECH = I if the client is in a high-tech industry defined as those industries that have
three digit SIC codes beginning with 283, 357, 737 and 873 plus those
industries in the SIC code range 3825-3839; 0 otherwise;
FDB
= a composite measure o f financial distress associated w ith the probability o f
bankruptcy;
FDL
= 1 if the sum o f each four quarterly net income am ounts immediately prior
to and including time i is less than zero; 0 otherwise;
FDl
= 1 if the sum o f each four quarterly net income am ounts immediately prior
to and including time t is less than zero and this net loss immediately
follows two years that reported net income; 0 otherwise;
TEN
= the number o f years that the client has engaged the incum bent auditor;
INDEP = [I - (client’s sales/total sales o f all clients o f the auditor)];
SIZE
= the natural logarithm o f total assets;
MISM = a composite measure o f the degree o f client-firm mismatch;
MR
= a composite measure denoting the likelihood o f misrepresentation by the
client;
LEG98 = 1 if the year is after 1998; 0 otherwise.
BIG5
= 1 if the company is audited by a Big 5 firm; 0 otherwise.

considered when seeking to gain insights into resignations based on the results o f this study. First, the
study did not distinguish between dismissals, declinations and resignations. Second, there are different
decision makers based on the type o f switch. Specifically, the decision maker for a dismissal is the
client while the decision maker for a resignation or a declination is a firm. Third, dismissals occur more
frequently than resignations and declination combined; therefore, the results o f the switch study may be
biased towards dismissals. Therefore, the effect that the size o f firm has on the probability o f a
resignation is not known and may not necessarily conflict with prior research findings.
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3.2 Data Collection
All publicly traded companies are required by the Securities and Exchange
Com m ission (SEC) to report various types o f information (filings) to the SEC. Filings
include Form 10-K (annual report), Form 10-Q (quarterly report), and Form

8

-K

(current report). Compact D/SEC is a source o f data that contains references to the
SEC filings (filing reference) o f all com panies required to make such filings.
Information about each filing reference includes the type o f form, the date o f the
filing, and possibly other information specific to a particular form.

The filing

reference for Form 8 -K ( 8 -K) is critical to this study in that it contains a numeric item
num ber that is associated with the contents o f the actual

8

-K.

The specific item

num ber necessary for this study is item four because this item num ber indicates that
information in the

8

-K is related to an auditor switch and that disclosures related a

switch have been filed with the SEC.
Based on filing information contained in the July, 1996 to January, 2001
quarterly Compact D/SEC discs (i.e., information pertaining to the period June 1996 to
Decem ber 2000), a resignation group o f com panies was identified as follows. First, a
search for all filing references for all companies during the period June, 1996 to
December, 2000 was performed. During this search process, all 8 -K filing references
that also had a reference to auditor switching (i.e. item four) w ere extracted to form an
auditor switching data set.

Second, the filing date o f each filing reference in the

auditor switching data set was used to locate the actual
exam ination o f each

8

8

-K in Lexis-Nexis.

Upon

-K item four, auditor switches that are resignations (verses

dism issals or declinations) w ere selected.
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Third, based on further examination o f the 8 -K for each resignation previously
selected, the following five criteria was used to determine w hich resignations were
excluded from further analysis. First, firm related issues disclosed in the

8

-K as the

reason for the resignation were excluded. These include firm changes (e.g., mergers,
splits or dissolutions), firm service issues (e.g., no longer serving public clients, no
longer providing audit services or the death o f partner) and firm independence issues
(e.g., unpaid fees or significant business relationship w ith client).

Second,

resignations that the 8 -K describes as a mutual agreement betw een the client and firm
were excluded because the underlying decision maker in these cases is not clear.
Third, resignations that were the result o f a company merger, a change in company
location or an audit o f a subsidiary o f the client were excluded.

Fourth, financial

companies (i.e., SIC codes 6000 to 6999) were excluded because the determinants o f
the client-firm alignment may be different than in other industries due to various
regulations imposed on clients (Shu 2000).

Fifth, additional exclusions include

resignations in which the date o f the resignation was not specifically mentioned or
there were m ultiple resignations for the same client that occurred less than two years
apart. After applying the five exclusion criteria previously mentioned, the remaining
resignations comprise the resignation group that was used in subsequent statistical
analyses.
A control group was formed based on the following steps. First, a group o f
non-resignation com panies was formed by eliminating from Com pustat any company
that was part o f the resignation group. Second, based on the num ber o f companies in
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the resignation group, an equal num ber o f the non-resignation com panies was selected
at random to form the control group.
A dditionally, a random event date was calculated for each company in the
control group as follows. First, the number o f days during the sample period (i.e.,
June 1, 1996 to D ecem ber 31, 2000) was calculated as 1,675.

Second, a random

number between 0 and 1,674 was chosen for each company.

Third, the random

number was added to the beginning date o f the study period (i.e., June 1, 1996) to
form a random date for each company.
Financial inform ation for companies in both the resignation and control group
was obtained from Compustat, Compact D/SEC and Lexis/Nexis. Companies that do
not have data available for all variables in the model were excluded.

3.3 Data Analysis
Logit estim ation is an empirical technique used to estim ate models (i.e. logit
models) that have a dichotom ous dependant variable.

Since this study has a

dichotomous dependant variable (i.e. resignation vs. non-resignation), a logit model
was developed and estimated.

The results were used to explain the occurrence o f

resignations and to evaluate the association between the independent variables and the
dependent variable.

3.4 Time-Varying Methodology
In regards to the time-varying nature o f this study, let t represent a
measurement date o f the independent variables (variables).
measurement date

(0

In regards to this

and empirical testing, t was first set equal to the last quarter-end

date that occurred prior to an event date. The event date for clients whose auditor
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resigned was the actual date the resignation took place as noted in the 8 -K. The event
date for clients w hose auditor did not resign w as chosen at random based on the dates
available during the study period (June 1996 to Decem ber 2000).

Second, each

variable was then m easured based on quarterly data available at time t. Third, the
model was estim ated and the results regarding the significance o f the variables and
model were analyzed. Fourth, t was then set equal to the penultim ate quarter-end date
prior to the event date and then the second and third steps previously discussed were
repeated based on this new t. Stated another way, each variable was be re-measured
based on a new t, the model was re-estimated and the results were re-analyzed. Fifth,
the last step (i.e., step four) was be repeated tw o more tim es except with different
quarter-end dates for t. These two dates w ere the two rem aining quarter-end dates o f
the four most recent quarter-end dates prior to the event date. In summary, the process
o f measuring, estim ating and analyzing the model was repeated until the results
associated with data relative to the four most recent quarters prior to the event date had
been analyzed.

3.S Conclusion
This chapter has presented a discussion o f the m ethodology used in this study,
the research hypotheses, the data sources, and the m ethod o f testing. Chapter four will
present the results o f the tests o f hypothesis.
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C H A PTER IV

Results

The results o f this study are presented in this chapter. Section 4 . 1 describes the
developm ent o f the data set.

Section 4.2 provides the overall descriptive statistics

related to the data. Section 4.3 provides the results o f the statistical analyses.

4.1 Data Set
The structure o f this subsection is as follows.

Section 4.1.1 presents a

description o f the databases used in this study. Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 describe the
process o f determ ining a group o f com panies in which the auditor resigned
(resignation group).

Section 4.1.4 describes the process o f determining a group o f

companies in which the auditor did not resign (control group).

Sections 4.1.5 and

4.1.6 describe the process o f gathering data for the full sample (i.e., resignation and
control group).
4.1.1

Database Description. Com pact D/SEC (CD SEC) is a database that

contains information on companies that file reports with the SEC.

In general,

companies included in this database have at least 500 shareholders o f one class o f
stock, have at least S5 million in assets, and have securities listed on a national
securities exchange or trade securities Over-the-Counter.

For each com pany in the

database, a variety o f corporate information is m aintained including a list o f the
specific forms that a com pany filed with the SEC but not the actual form itself. The 8 -

59
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K is one form where CDSEC maintains specific filing information for each company,
namely the date the

8

-K was filed and a numerical code representing the item

number(s) that are included in the 8 -K (e.g., 4 for item four, see Table 2.1).
4.1.2

Resignation Filinas. Using the

8

-K information contained in each

quarterly CDSEC disc beginning w ith the July 1996 disc and ending with the April
2001 disc, all

8

-Ks that were reported as being filed during the period June 19961

through December 2000 that included a numerical code o f four (i.e., indicating that a
change in auditor had occurred) were selected for further analysis.
process yielded a total o f 3,652 references to

8

This selection

-Ks that potentially contained

disclosures related to a change in auditor . 2
Based upon an analysis o f the 3,652 filing references initially selected, those
that were not related to resignations were excluded as follows (see Table 4.1). First,
before any attempt was made to locate an 8 -K, the following three exclusions (pre 8 -K
exclusions) were employed: duplicate filing references (50), filing references o f
foreign companies (103), and filing references o f financial com panies (536).
result o f employing the pre

8

As a

-K exclusions (689), 2,963 filing references remained.

Second, information in each o f the 2,963 filing references was used to locate and
examine the

8

-K as stored in the Edgar and/or Lexis/Nexis databases in order to

determ ine the type o f auditor change. In this regard, two other exclusions ( 8 -K search
exclusions) were employed:

8

-K s not found (62) and

8

-Ks with no auditor change

' Electronic filings became mandatory for all domestic companies during May 1996. Accordingly, data
was included in the analysis beginning with June 1996 in order to ensure that all 8-Ks could be accessed
in the SEC Edgar database or in the Lexis/Nexis database.
2 Since there could be more than one filing per auditor change, the number o f filings doesn’t represent
the number o f auditor changes during June 1996 through December 2000. Also, 14 filing references for
forms other than the 8-K (e.g., 10-Q) were found based on an item four code used as part o f the filing
reference for these forms. These are included in the 3,652 total filing references found.
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disclosure (74). As a result o f the additional 8 -K search exclusions (136), 2,827

8

-Ks

remained. Third, while the remaining 8 -Ks all related to an auditor switch, not all o f
the auditor switches specifically related to resignations.

The

8

-K s not related to a

resignation were also excluded (non-resignation auditor switch exclusions) as follows:
dism issals (1,853), declinations (105), and
specifically stated (143).

8

-Ks found but the type o f switch was not

As a result o f employing the additional non-resignation

auditor switch exclusions (2,101), a total o f 726

8

-Ks specifically related to

resignations remained.
4.1.3

Resignation Group. An analysis o f the 726

prelim inary resignation group) was perform ed to determ ine w hich
excluded from further analysis.
m ultiple

8

8

8

-Ks (representing a

-Ks should be

The prim ary resignation exclusion resulted from

-Ks that were related to the sam e auditor change (198).

In general, this

occurred because the successor auditor was not known when the initial 8 -K w as filed
and, subsequently, another

8

-K was filed to disclose this information.

There were

several additional reasons for excluding 8 -Ks from the prelim inary resignation group.
First, 34 observations were excluded because the firm encountered some form o f
independence problem that motivated them to resign.

These problems included

unpaid fees, a significant business relationship with the com pany, o r litigation related
to the company.

Second, 18 observations were excluded because the firm was no

longer providing audit services, in general, or the firm was no longer providing audit
services specifically to public companies.

Third, 16 observations were excluded

because it was unclear w hether the change in auditor was a decision made solely by
the firm or a joint decision by the firm and company. In these cases, the 8 -K disclosed
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TABLE 4.1
______________________ Resignation Group Formation______________________
Total filing references indicating an auditor change: June 1996 to December 2000

3,652

Pre 8-K Search Exclusions:
Duplicate filing references
Filing references o f foreign companies
Filing references o f financial companies

50
103
536

689
2,963

8-K Search Exclusions:
8-Ks not found
8-Ks with no auditor switch disclosure

62
74

136
2,827

Non-resignation Auditor Switch Exclusions:
8-Ks related to dismissals
8-Ks related to declinations
8-Ks with auditor switch disclosure but type o f switch not specifically stated

1,853
105
143

2,101
726

Resignation Exclusions:
8-Ks tiled subsequent to the initial resignation disclosure
Firm independence issues
Firm service issues
Decision-maker in resignation not clear
Firm changes
Engagement problems
Company merger
Resignation not related to parent company
Change in company location
One or more o f the reasons above combined
Resignation date unknown
Multiple resignations less than two years apart

198
34
18
16
16
8
7
5
3
5
1
16

Resignation Group

327
399

that either there was a mutual agreement between the com pany and the firm or that the
resignation was a result o f negotiations between the com pany and firm. Fourth, 16
observations were excluded because the firm underwent structural changes that
motivated them to resign. These included mergers, the sale o f an office o r an entire
practice, a relocation o f the firm, or the dissolution o f the firm. Fifth,
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were excluded because o f engagement problem s encountered w ith the client. These
included instances o f coordination or timing problem s, scope lim itations and problems
with other w ork perform ed for the company.

Sixth, 7 observations were excluded

because the resignation was linked to a com pany merger.

In general, these

resignations were due to the desire o f the com pany to maintain the continuity o f the
audit engagem ent with the firm that audited the other com pany that was part o f the
merger. Seventh, 16 observations (i.e.,

8

individual companies) a company had two

resignations that were two years or less apart.

These were excluded due to

methodological concerns about independence among the observations in the study.
The remaining reasons (indicated in Table 4.1) for excluding observations are fairly
self-explanatory and, for convenience, no additional discussion is provided. In sum,
after all exclusions have been considered, the final resignation group (resignation
group) consists o f 399 observations.
4 . 1 .4

Control Group. A control group was formed using data contained in the

Compustat database as follows. First, the population o f Compustat companies (21,369
research and active) was reduced to form a non-resignation group.

In this regard,

companies were excluded if they met any o f the following criteria: the company did
not report any total assets during the study period (i.e., total assets was used as an
indicator that financial information about the company was available), foreign
companies, financial companies, non-parent companies (e.g., subsidiaries), or the
company was included in the resignation group.

As a result o f applying these

exclusions (13,411), a total o f 7,958 companies remained to form the non-resignation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

group. Second, a random sample o f 400 com panies from the non-resignation group
was extracted to form the control group.
Additionally, a random event date was calculated for each com pany in the
control group as follows. First, the number o f days during the sample period (i.e.,
June 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000) was calculated as 1,675.

Second, a random

num ber between 0 and 1,674 was chosen for each com pany.

Third, the random

num ber was added to the beginning date o f the study period (i.e., June I, 1996) to
form the random date.
4 . 1 .5

Data Collection. The data used in this study to measure each variable

was accum ulated from four different sources: Edgar, Lexis/Nexis, Compustat, and
CDSEC.

As previously described in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, CDSEC, Edgar and

Lexis/Nexis were used to determine the set o f com panies in which the auditor resigned
(i.e., resignation group).

Also, section 4.1.4 described how Compustat was used to

form a set o f companies that formed the control group.

As a result, the dependant

variable, RESIGN, was set to one for each com pany in the resignation group and zero
for each com pany in the control group.
CDSEC data was used to measure all or part o f four independent variables.
First, the TECH variable was set to one if the SIC code obtained from CDSEC was
within the ranges o f SIC codes that prior research has used to denote high-tech
industries (see section 3.1.1). Second, the calculation o f the variable used to proxy for
the independence o f the auditor (INDEP) required that total revenues for each client
audited by a firm, both Big 5 and non-Big 5, be available. CDSEC provided this level
o f detail, whereas Com pustat does not distinguish betw een the names o f the auditors
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o f all non-Big 5 firms. Third, the calculation o f the variable used to measure the level
o f m ism atch between the auditor and client (LM ISM ) required that market shares o f
each firm be calculated based on total audited assets o f each client. CDSEC provides
the name o f each firm as well as the amount o f total assets whereas, as previously
stated, Com pustat does not.

Fourth, one com ponent o f the variable designed to

indicate the likelihood o f future client m isrepresentation (M R) was the percentage o f
officers on the board o f directors (see section 3.1.7). This percentage was calculated
based on the list o f officers and the list o f directors available for each company in
CDSEC.
Com pustat and Lexis/Nexis were other sources o f data. Compustat was used
to calculate the variables that proxied for financial distress (LFDB, FDL, FDl), the
tenure o f the auditor (TEN), and the size o f the com pany (SIZE).

In addition,

Compustat was used to calculate the com ponent o f the client misrepresentation
variable (M R) that was designed to measure the deficiencies in a com pany’s free-cash
flows (FREEC).

Lexis/Nexis was used to search for disclosures related to loan

defaults and errors and/or irregularities as previously discussed in section 3.1.7.
During the data collection process, data for som e variables were not available.
As a result, observations that did not have com plete data for all variables for a quarterend date prior to the event date were excluded. Additionally, companies whose audit
firm maintained a low involvement in their industry were also excluded.

A low

involvement o f a firm was defined as auditing five or fewer com panies in an industry.
Consequently, the total number o f observations in the resignation group (399) and the
control group (400) were reduced based on the additional exclusions. As shown in
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Table 4.2, the resignation (control) group contained a total o f 116 (121) observations
that had complete data for the first quarter-end date prior to the event date. The total
number o f observations after all exclusions for the three remaining quarter-end dates is
also displayed.
4.1.6 Data Transformations.

Three variables were transformed in order to

provide values that would better approxim ate a linear relationship between the
variables and the dependant variable used

in subsequent model

estimation.

Specifically, the calculation o f variables FDB, SIZE, and MISM resulted in a range o f
values within each variable that had a large variation. As a result, it is possible that
each variable’s effect on the dependant variable might be different at different levels
o f the variable; hence, the relationship might not be linear in nature. As a result, each
o f the values in each variable was transformed by calculating the natural logarithm and
placing the result in a new variable. Thus, the following three variables were formed:
LFDB, LSIZE, and LMISM.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for each variable in each o f the four time periods
prior to the event date (e.g., t-i, t.2 , L3 and L4 ) are shown in Table 4.2. In regards to the
continuous variables, univariate statistics designed to show differences between the
means o f variables in the resignation and control groups reveal that variables LFDB,
TEN and LSIZE are significantly different in all four tim e periods. Specifically, the
tenure o f the auditor (TEN) and the size o f the com pany (LSIZE) were significantly
lower for the resignation group. Additionally, clients in the resignation group w ere in
greater financial distress (LFDB) than companies in the control group. The m eans o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

1= §

®= I

00 — 0 00 Os m SO fN fN

o
U

II
c

—

»X
) 00 <N
^ o 00

o

S

'

N—

— 'S'

O m >n \o
— fN rn 0 ( N ^ n
»xi fN —
•

os

oo

o ^ wa H
—_ > e9C-

00 o

fN —■

fN

J= ^ U w
iO
C
S

"O
s ^ •oIX
O O 'O Os —
ea ^ 00J S
SO Os m Os q
*35 —
q q 00 Os o
o it
»xv rn
^
C* ~ •"

I

S t g

>.£ = "
|‘ J! | 8- u
o-x: — 51 vs
r- fN
rfN *—00 rn r*i. q
—
fN q fN fN
fN
rn
—
• 3

00

d

00 ©

*"
m 2
£
r-* \

fN oo

■
»5
3 «
c “ I

in O

3. s C

- S^ :

fN —
■

a c V :i

y ’s u , _
5 •: 5 5 £
S
fl &
u w
^.

y

§

—

V "3 * . 2 g

^ o p 3 a«
E *5 §
00 mm
vO o
00 ^r —m
TT rn rf
II
o
c

0 \ rs »r>
o 00 Os 'O
o
OS Os o fN Os fN
srs
’’f
>
—
3

^

: s®

■s, 2 .5 ^
e C
T

H c

^

22
N cC3

o

o

®l —
fN

—

[I
_
3?

s JS

!• c C
i .2® ^ .5 c

•—

i u
'>. •j
w
'•
M
l
m 3>
i O
fN •— »X
rr — r^*
»xi r1
1
^ irl

—i
m Oi
*T 00 r*>
“i
sO Os S 3 Os <*n rg
Os q — q rn q m
rn
•—’ rn

fN

«

i I l C2
•£ £. -j —
v~
“ p r v x
- a c c 2
“ <5 S ^

' t . oo
r-~ O

§

m ”

It

,

*2 E

U <«
—

rn
fN 00
O fN Os ^
mm fN fN m
o q
fN q 'T f o Os q
II
rn d <ri
i
c

00
fN O
oo 00
r>*
— o r*“>
f^4 Cs
fN "" fN

ix

ex <00
N

S

a

x

-3

N0
O

fN

fi »
%e I I ^

C. o
>»*5
^ V
,
c. •—

—

a C
c
u 2 i!
C >
% % v»
•yT J | i f
O <
rn “
r- >v^ *n "*
30 X — 80 ^
5 a
-A “2 II j*a £
? S O
S
3
_
1
f3
x 3 1
C
2 c vT a. » "H
_i/i U
s * s >*
5 V 2 ^ ^ *5

as .£
H *sl

“2

c

(A
g

k_

1 ^

3
•a
^3
c ^ T
O o Os fN fN 00
» |)< N m
*T sO
Os O fN o r^*
sn q q q Os o q q po
u II
rf »r5 rn
rn
°* a

35 —

rN O © oe
t-* oo oo rx
O 'I
O s

—0 * ^ 0

—

O <xi

m m
o’ —

>§

s 1*1 p

•/■*o I
o *
2
^
c
oc
e c
rN ft u
2 :
"* yi

X "2

Os m
3 £ 3
fN
o —q q
q
fN M fN O — fN
fN fN

3 fS ,«J

u- rj^s 5JX5 1
N£&•?
?
2

5 C
C ^

C g
—
q
E S > * 5 '* - e 3 “
~ « 5 — 2 m
) fN fN fK —
*? 00* IX
r*~, fN —
X "" Os a S3 & g « - i 1 c II ^
.2

^ §
-2 Ss-. “a -e s“i 2= i=' S^

ezp S'
35 i
a:

*3
00 o
Os fN f^.
O 00 r- Os © mm
t+\ q o Os © q
IX) ^r
fN

«—

O
00
fN
SO
r-- ■^r q
— -• fN

q
IX)
fN

©
d

^

^
^
oo

y© 00

_ © <n

«X
) ^

~

3 -r
*»i Xi<
i- — =! -y. tr S
=
>
» “3
■S a 2
i
“ >v —
S
3c
=

®

i u

’-

i

^5 *5£
6a M
-y5
c—
. i 5 i ! u

c §

23 -5?
S
—a -s
5e .. c yj >i x

a *

^

ft a

5 3 M

« ,.ui ^S3 p

N

~x -X

•5

c « E -

V a x
~ ' C C u "3 •— - s ^

■a-3-H =
-

3

t

• •

3

yt 1

C

S *5 ■

a y r T3 2
tf _e r - 3—-r
5* h .
h. ft ft <3 -3 o
S
—
a o u c a

'S -3 a 3
3
-2
.c

.2
C
3

>

50-« c
xs xa n3a a<s
2 w
:
e.
_
•- g 3 2 = ~- •vj*: ^u
C

—

a
a

u

Z

UJ

1

F

-J

H

2

u

5

Si.

oo
Os
O
-J

«X
)

a

> "§

-X

£ d 2 .5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

.2

!M

§•j S§
—

3* X

>>

S a

fl

3

—

68

the remaining continuous variables representing the independence o f the auditor
(INDEP) and the degree o f client-firm mismatch (LM ISM ) w ere not significantly
different at the .01 level in any time period. In regards to the dichotom ous variables,
the percent occurrence o f each variable in each group over the four time periods
reveals that the resignation group had com panies that had a greater occurrence o f a net
loss (FDL) and were more likely to issue misleading financial statem ents (MR). The
variable designed to indicate that a sudden loss had occurred (FD I) revealed that only
a small num ber o f com panies in the sample met this condition.

As a result, this

variable was excluded from further analysis. Additionally, the resignation group, in
general, contained a slightly greater percentage o f companies that operated in hightech industries (TECH) except for the last period in w hich the percentage was
approximately equal. Also, a large percentage o f the com panies in both groups were
audited by a Big 5 firm (BIG5); however, the percentage occurrence o f a Big 5 auditor
for companies in the resignation group was slightly lower than that o f the control
group over all time periods. Finally, the percent occurrence o f quarter-end dates after
1998 (LEG98) was slightly greater for the resignation group except for the last time
period in which the percent occurrence was slightly lower than the control group.

4.3 Results
As a result o f prelim inary analysis, three variables w ere excluded from the
model. First, a noted in section 4.2, variable FDI was excluded because o f the limited
num ber companies in either the resignation or control group that m et the criteria that
caused the variable to be set to one. Second, variable INDEP w as excluded because o f
the limited variation in this variable. The standard deviation over all tim e periods was
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between .001 and .004, and given that the values associated with this variable are
percents and are constrained by zero and one, the variation in this variable is very
small. As a result, there is an insufficient variation to accurately measure the intended
effect associated w ith this variable. Additionally, the low variation in this variable
caused many o f the DFBETAs for this variable to be extrem ely large and well beyond
acceptable limits (N eter et al. 1996). Third, variable LFDB was also excluded. LFDB
was designed to be a more comprehensive continuous m easure o f the financial distress
o f a company and therefore provide better fit in the regression models over the simpler
variable FDL, w hich is a dichotomous variable set to one if the company currently has
a net loss. However, the use o f FDL alone in the m odels produced a better overall fit.
Therefore, FDL w as used in subsequent model estim ations instead o f variable LFDB.
Based on the exclusion o f the three variables previously mentioned, hypotheses two,
four, and six (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.4) were not able to be empirically examined
and thus are not supported.
Table 4.3 presents the results o f estimating the m odel using a logit regression
analysis at the four quarter-end dates immediately prior to an event date. The number
o f observations is slightly greater than that shown in Table 4.2 because the exclusion
o f variables LFDB, FDI and INDEP reduced the num ber o f observations that had data
limitations. O verall, the model is statistically significant at each date in which the
model was estim ated (estim ation date).

Chi-square statistics for the model ranged

from 110.4 to 144.3 with associated p-values o f .000 for all estimation dates.
Additionally, the

likelihood ratio index (i.e.,

LR =

1 -

log likelihood at

convergence/log likelihood at zero) was also calculated. The LR (sometimes called
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M cFadden’s-R2 statistic) is a psuedo R2 measure that indicates a m odel’s explanatory
power. As shown in Table 4.3, the LR index decreases as estim ation dates further
away from the event date are used. Stated another way, using information closer to
the event date increases the explanatory power o f the model.
Three variables were statistically insignificant at each estim ation date (i.e.,
TECH, LEG98 and BIG5). First, variable TECH was associated with hypothesis one.
This hypothesis states that clients operating in high technology industries are
positively related to the probability o f an auditor resignation; however, this was not
supported.

Second, variable LEG98 was associated with hypothesis ten.

This

hypothesis states that the passage o f the SLUSA o f 1998 reduced an auditor’s
litigation risk and is negatively related to the probability o f an auditor resignation.
Results show that this hypothesis was not supported.

Third, variable BIG5 was

associated with hypothesis eleven. This hypothesis states that the size o f the firm (i.e.,
Big 5) that audits a com pany is positively related to the probability o f a resignation.
This hypothesis was not supported.
Variables FDL, TEN and LSIZE were statistically significant at each
estimation date and the signs o f the coefficients were consistent with the associated
hypotheses.

Therefore, it appears that resignations are more likely to occur when

companies are in financial distress (FDL), when the tenure o f the auditor is low
(TEN), and when the size o f the client is small (LSIZE). Thus, hypotheses three, five,
and seven (respectively) are supported.
The likelihood o f misrepresentations on the part o f m anagem ent was modeled
by variable MR. This variable was statistically significant w ith the expected sign only
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TABLE 4.3
Results*

Variable
Constant

TECH

FDL

TEN

LSIZE

LMISM

MR

LEG98

BIG5

N
Chi-square
LR index0
Classification rate11

Coefficient
Marginal Effectb
(t-value)
3.144*
.786
(2.564)
-.678
-.169
(-1.492)
.963 **
.241
(2.439)
-.126*
-.031
(-3.049)
-.469 *
-.117
(-4.150)
-.333 *
-.083
(-2.308)
1.629 *
.407
(4.008)
.032
.008
(.088)
-.791
-.198
(-.800)
243
133.7*
.40
81.1%

Coefficient
Marginal Effect
(t-value)
3.074 *
.765
(2.655)
-.331
-.082
(-.749)
.945*
.235
(2.584)
-.129 *
-.032
(-3.264)
-.478 *
-.119
(-4.348)
-.300 *
-.075
(-2.160)
1.629 *
.405
(4.017)
.444
-.110
(1.201)
-.806
-.201
(-.838)
259
144.3 *
.40
83.4%

Coefficient
Marginal Effect
(t-value)
3.899 *
.972
(3.414)
-.456
-.114
(-1.122)
.872**
.217
(2.420)
-.152 *
-.038
(-3.789)
-.511 *
-.127
(-4.675)
-.379 **
-.094
(-2.715)
.654
.163
(1.632)
.516
.129
(1-423)
-.740
-.184
(-.799)

Coefficient
Marginal Effect
(t-value)
3.805 *
.948
(3.573)
-.682
-.170
(-1.690)
1.077*
.268
(3.074)
-.169*
-.042
(-4.317)
-.419*
-.104
(-4.118)
-.388 **
-.097
(-2.961)
.413
.103
(1-101)
.051
.013
(134)
-.809
-.202
(-934)

250
119.6*
.35
78.4%

248
110.4 *
.32
77.4%

' Results reported for a logit regression analysts estimated at four quarter-end dates immediately prior to an event date t and
are denoted by t , where x = 1. 2, 3. 4. Variables in the model are as follows. RESIGN = 1 for companies whose auditor
resigned. TECH = 1 if a company’s SIC code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, or between 3825 and 3839 FDL = 1 if a
company has a net loss based on the four quarters immediately prior to and including t ,. TEN is the tenure of the auditor in
years. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at t L.MISM is the natural logarithm of a measure designed to capture
the degree of mismatch between a client and their auditor. MR = 1 if there is a greater likelihood of misrepresentation on the
part of management. LEG98 = I if the year at i , is greater than 1998. BIG5 = 1 if a company is audited by a Big 5 firm.
“ Marginal effects are calculated as the partial derivatives of the expected probability o f a resignation conditioned on the
vector of independent variables evaluated at each variable’s mean.
c LR index is the log likelihood ratio index computed as 1 - log likelihood at convergence/log likelihood at zero.
d Classification rate is based on models ability to classify both resignations and non-resignations.
Significant at the .01 level.
** Significant at the .05 level. _____________________ __________________________________________________________

for the two quarter-end dates immediately preceding the event date (i.e., Li and t-2 ),
thus lending support to hypothesis nine.

This suggests that the impact o f the
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disclosure o f information that indicates a greater likelihood o f misrepresentation on
the part o f management on a firm ’s decision to resign is sensitive to time.
Specifically, recall that M R was based on the disclosure o f such information within 12
m onths prior to each estim ation date (see section 3.1.7) and that the results that
showed that this variable was statistically significant only for the two estimation dates
im m ediately preceding the event date (see Table 4.3).
Variable LMISM was designed to measure the degree o f client-firm mismatch,
and as proposed in hypothesis eight, this variable had a predicted positive relationship
to the probability o f an auditor resignation.

Results show that this variable was

significant at each estimate date; however, the sign is opposite to that proposed. A
possible explanation o f this result is that in the context o f resignations the variable is
measuring a different motivation associated with a firm’s evaluation o f their client
portfolios than that proposed. Specifically, recall that LMISM is based on the theory
that a decrease in a firm ’s market share and/or a relatively low market share compared
to the m arket share o f the firm with the highest market share is associated with an
increased likelihood o f a client-firm mismatch and an increased likelihood o f a
resignation (see section 3.1.6). However, based on the results, it is possible that the
use o f firm market shares in this context indicates that firms that have an increase in
their m arket share and/or a relatively high market share (i.e., a low LM ISM) may re
evaluate their client portfolio and choose to resign from those engagements that are
more risky and/or less profitable. Conversely, firms that have a decrease in market
share and/or a relatively low m arket share (i.e., a high LM ISM) may be less likely to
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resign in order to m aintain the current and future profitability associated with their
clients.
In addition to the results presented above, the marginal effects o f each variable
are also given in Table 4.3. These represent the partial derivatives o f the expected
probability o f a resignation conditioned on the vector o f independent variables
evaluated at the mean o f each variable.

W hile using the m ean for continuous

independent variables in these calculations is intuitive, using the mean o f dichotomous
independent variables is not; however, the marginal effect o f dichotom ous variables
evaluated at their mean does provide a reasonable approximation to the change in the
probability o f the dependant variable given that sample sizes are large (G reene 2000).
Based on the m arginal effects in Table 4.3, it appears that certain statistically
significant independent variables play a larger role in the resignation decision than
others.

Specifically, the largest impact on the decision to resign is produced by

variable MR.

In this case, factors that may lead a firm to suspect potential

misrepresentations by m anagem ent increase the probability that an auditor will resign
by approximately 41% on average over the first tw o estimation dates (i.e., L| and Li).
However, as previously stated above, this effect is sensitive to time. The next variable
that has the m ost influential marginal effect is FDL.

Based on its m arginal effect,

companies that have a net loss increase the likelihood that their auditor w ill resign by
approximately 24% on average over all estimation dates. LSIZE is another variable
whose marginal effect is presented; however, since this variable is based on the natural
logarithm

o f total

transformation.

assets,

its

interpretation

is

somewhat

obscured

by

the

Still, an interpretation based on the transformation does provided
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some information.

Therefore, based on the results, a one unit increase in LSIZE

decreases the likelihood o f a resignation by 11.7% on average over all estimation
dates.

The remaining two variables have a sm aller im pact on the probability o f a

resignation relatively speaking. Based on the results for TEN , each additional year o f
an audit engagement reduces the likelihood o f a resignation betw een 3% and 4%, and
based on the results for LMISM, a one unit increase in this variable reduces the
likelihood o f a resignation by approximately 8.7% on average.
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C H A PTE R V

Conclusions

The structure o f this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 provides a summary o f
the study. Section 5.2 provides the implications that relate to the results o f the study.
Section 5.3 provides a sum m ary o f the limitations and possible extensions o f the
study.

5.1 Summary
There were two main objectives o f this study (see section 1.2).

The first

objective was to develop a theoretical model that will explain auditor resignations. To
meet this objective, a model was developed which was prim arily grounded in prior
research related to auditor resignations as well as prior research addressing auditor
switching.

In this regard, the following variables were included in the model: the

industry in w hich the client operates (specifically, high-tech industries), the client’s
financial distress as measured by the presence o f a net loss, the tenure o f the auditor,
the level o f independence o f the auditor, the size o f the client, the likelihood o f
misrepresentations on the part o f management and the size o f the auditor (specifically,
Big 5 firms).
Additionally, two other variables, each representing derivations from variables
employed in prior research related to auditor resignations and/or prior research related

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

to auditor switching, w ere also included in the model.

Specifically, a variable that

measured the financial distress o f the client in a more comprehensive fashion by
utilizing a bankruptcy prediction model was included as well as a variable that
measured the level o f client-firm mismatch based on changes in firm ’s market shares.
Finally, two other variables, not included in the literature to date regarding auditor
resignations and auditor switching, were also included in the model. Specifically, a
variable was included to model the impact o f the changes in the legal environment
(specifically, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f 1998) as well as a
variable to model a current net loss that follows two periods o f net income (sudden net
loss).
The second objective was to estimate the model at several different quarterly
dates immediately prior to an event date so that the effects o f time on the explanatory
power o f the model and each independent variable could be ascertained.

This

objective was met by identifying and collecting data for each variable in the model for
a sample o f com panies and by using a regression technique to estim ate the model. In
regards to identifying and collecting data, the first step perform ed was to use the
Compact D/SEC (CD SEC) database to identify the resignations that took place from
June, 1996 to December, 2000. The result o f this process was a resignation group o f
companies in which the event date was the actual date o f the resignation. Second, the
Compustat database was used to form a control group o f companies, and an event date
was assigned to each com pany by selecting a date at random from all the possible
dates during the sam ple period. Third, data for companies in both the resignation and
control groups were obtained from Compustat, CDSEC, and/or Lexis/Nexis.
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In regards to estimating the model, a logit regression technique was employed.
As a result o f prelim inary analysis, three variables were excluded from the model.
First, the variable designed to measure a client's financial distress by utilizing a
bankruptcy model (FDB) was excluded because the financial distress measure based
on the presence o f a net loss provided a better overall fit in the model. Second, the
variable designed to measure a sudden net loss (FDI) was excluded because o f the
limited num ber o f com panies that met this condition. Third, the variable designed to
measure the independence o f the auditor (INDEP) was excluded because the variation
o f this variable was not sufficient to measure its effect in the model.
Overall results from estimating the model suggest that the model was
significant for each o f the four quarterly time periods and that using information closer
to the event date increased the m odel’s explanatory power. In regards to the specific
independent variables, the results suggest that, for all quarterly time periods, firms are
more likely to resign from (1) clients who are sm aller in size (LSIZE); (2) clients who
are in financial distress as modeled by a net loss (FDL); (3) engagem ents in which the
tenure o f the auditor is low (TEN); and (4) clients who are in industries in which the
auditor has
Additionally,

an

increasing and/or a relatively high

com panies

that

had

a

greater

m arket share (LMISM).

likelihood

of

management

misrepresentation (M R) were also associated w ith an increase in the likelihood o f a
resignation; however, this association was sensitive to time.

Specifically, this

association was only significant in the two quarterly time periods immediately prior to
the event date. Finally, the following variables were not significant at any estimation
date: (I) changes in the litigation environment (LEG98); (2) clients in high-tech
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industries (TECH); and, (3) clients audited by larger firms (BIG5). Thus, the results
suggest that these variables were not an important part o f a firm ’s decision to resign.

5.2 Implications
As previously indicated, the results suggest that firms were more likely to
resign from clients who currently had a net loss. Given that a net loss is a proxy for
financial distress, this result is consistent w ith prior resignation research (Shu 2000).
The results also suggest, consistent w ith prior resignation research, that firms were
more likely to resign from clients who had a greater likelihood o f misrepresentation on
the part o f m anagem ent (Menon and W illiams 1999). These results suggest that firms
do respond to variables related to the client that may indicate a greater degree o f audit
risk and (such firms) are not solely fixed on generating audit fees at the expense o f
external parties to the client.
Additionally, the results, which are consistent with prior resignation research,
suggest that firms were also more likely to resign from clients in situations where
auditor tenure was low (Menon and W illiams 1999). This m ay indicate that, as firms
become increasingly knowledgeable o f the negative attributes o f their client relatively
soon after the client acceptance decision (e.g., significant weaknesses in internal
controls not known at the time o f the client acceptance decision), such firms may
respond by resigning. If this is true, then this also suggests, as previously mentioned,
that firms do respond to increases in audit risk by resigning and are not solely fixed on
generating audit fees.
Further, the results suggest, consistent with prior resignation research, that
firms are m ore likely to resign from sm aller clients (M enon & W illiam s 1999). This
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may suggest a bias (to some degree) on the part o f firms toward those clients that
generate larger fees for the firm. It also appears that as firms gain market share in an
industry, this allows them to be m ore selective o f the clients that they keep, perhaps
resigning from those engagements that are less profitable and/or more risky.
Finally, the results suggest two additional implications. First, the enactment o f
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act o f 1998 (SLUSA) did not change the
overall litigation risk faced by firms such that they would alter their decision m aking
regarding resignations. It is possible that firms may require that the SLUSA be tested
in actual court cases before they will perceive a reduction in litigation risk. Second,
differences in the resignation decision criteria between Big 5 and non-Big 5 firms may
not be as substantial as expected. However, significant differences may exist in these
criteria among the Big 5 (non-Big 5) firms, but they may offset each other when the
Big 5 (non-Big 5) firms, as in this study, are considered as a group.

S.3 Limitations and Extensions
The findings o f this study may be limited in generalizability given that (1) the
sample period corresponded w ith a period o f relative economic prosperity and (2) the
sample was limited to publicly traded companies.

Accordingly, additional insights

regarding resignations may be obtained from future research in which (1) the sample
period corresponds with a period o f economic uncertainty and/or (2) the sample
includes privately held companies.

Admittedly, a firm’s decision to resign may be

based on client or firm factors not yet addressed in the literature. Accordingly, future
research regarding the nature o f such factors could provide additional insights
regarding resignations.
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Proxies were used to indirectly measure several factors (i.e., independent
variables) in this study. In this regard, future research could rely on direct measures o f
such factors as additional information becomes available.

For example, effective

February 5, 2001, the SEC modified the reporting requirem ents on proxy statements
such that the following information must be disclosed: aggregate audit fees, aggregate
fees for financial information systems design and implementation, and aggregate fees
for non-audit services. As a result, data related to one o r more o f these types o f fees
could be used to directly measure audit fees (versus, as in this study, the use o f client
revenues as a proxy for audit fees).
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